Goodbye to a Great Friend

One of the finest Labs in town, a great friend and a Nabisco Graham Cracker aficionado.  Please accept our memorial off "Sadie Point" and rest in peace.

NOW AVAILABLE - FREE 2014 SUPPLEMENT TO SMALL BUSINESS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING GUIDEBOOK

 

 DOWNLOAD YOUR FREE VERSION OF THE ABOVE SUPPLEMENT FROM THE "POWERED BY BOX" CUBE IN THE RIGHT MARGIN OF THIS SITE. 

HAPPY 72ND BIRTHDAY - TONY ROSE

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What is a True Personal Story of Yours that People Have a Hard Time Believing?

Control Tower at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon after the Tet Offensive - Photo by Anthony G. Borra

On a layover weather delay in route from Washington National to Houston I began a conversation with a gentleman who was also delayed.  We had common interests in business and as former soldiers.  

During the course of our conversation I learned he was an executive with a casino operation in the US and had immigrated in the late 70's from Saigon. 

We further established that we had been on opposite sides of the US/Vietnam conflict and had more than likely been firing our weapons at each other during the Tet Offensive in January of 1968. 

We both had too many details of the battle near Tan Son Nhut Air Base  for it to be any form of coincidence.

Tet Offensive

When we arrived at Houston, he bought me a meal and we became friends. We are still in touch today.

Quora Top Writer 2013 Award

 

 



 

A Neat Award from Quora. Quill and Ink badge on Quora profile and a fleece jacket with emblem.

This year's class includes 650 writers representing over 40 countries.

Click on page linked below for quill and ink badge to view details.  (no registration required).

https://www.quora.com/Ken-Larson

HAPPY HOLIDAYS FROM ROSE COVERED GLASSES

 

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The US Army's Future Mission is Vague, Leaving Industry with Little Direction

                                                              Photo "Go Army. com"

As an Army Veteran, and having worked in Aerospace over 3 decades to support  Army programs, I found the below article by John Keller, Editor in Chief, "Military & Aerospace Electronics" magazine an objective and disturbing piece.  Note the references to mission vacuum and lack of civilian leadership in Washington D.C.

John highlights that as the nation is struggling with stagnated politics the services are hampered by a lack of hard information to plan ahead.

Mr. Keller introduces a historical perspective and an excellent view of the hard issues, challenges and uncertainty that the Army and industry in its supporting role are facing today.

"MILITARY AND AEROSPACE ELECTRONICS":

"A variety of factors are gathering into a potential perfect storm  that could threaten the U.S. Army's future mission, the continuing  relevance of the oldest American military service, and how the defense industry can move forward to support the Army's needs.

Some of these factors are well-known: sequestration, dim prospects  for budget growth, and substantial technology research and development  that for most practical purposes has come nearly to a dead-stop.

Perhaps most serious, however, is how top military and civilian  leadership define the Army's role moving into the future, the top  threats the Army will evolve to meet, and the very relevance of a large  standing Army in an era when large-scale, big-iron military land battles  appear to be part of the past.

Here's where we are today: U.S. military forces are finishing their  exit from Iraq, where they have operated for more than a decade. Their  final exit from Afghanistan is but a few years off, or less. When  operations on Southwest Asia are completed, where does the Army go from  there?

The Army has had a clear set of missions since  the U.S. entered World War II in 1941. Although the close of the Second  World War in 1945 saw a rapid drawdown in U.S. military power, the  strengthening Soviet Union was on everyone's mind.

Less than five years after World War II ended, North Korea invaded  South Korea, which created another sudden and dire mission for the Army.  That mission grew from containing North Korean forces to containing  Communism around the world, which continued until the fall of the Berlin  Wall in 1990. One year later, Iraq invaded Kuwait, which gave rise to  Operation Desert Shield, and eventually the military ouster of Iraqi  forces from Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm, in which the Army played a  central role.

For the next decade, keeping an eye on a contained-but-restless Iraqi  military, on ethnic strife in what then was Yugoslavia, and on other  simmering hot spots throughout the world held the Army's attention and  helped define its mission.

Today things are different. Counter-insurgency operations are nearing  an end in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia does not pose the immediate  military threat that did its predecessors of the Soviet Union, and  Europe has been relatively quiet.

Still, trouble spots persist in areas like Syria and Iran, but with  no open conflict yet involving U.S. Army forces. There is no immediate  and dire threat in these areas, and hence no clear Army mission-at least  not yet.

So how does the Army move forward? Counter-insurgency, certainly. Special Forces capability, of  course. But what's the role of the large Army infrastructure involving  large combat infantry units, main battle tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and other organizations designed for large ground conflicts?

I'm not sure there is a role, and I'm not convinced that the top Army  leadership today knows what its role in the future will be, either.  Maybe the Army is at a moment of transition, and leaders will get a  handle on the Army's core mission sometime soon. With the civilian  leadership vacuum we have in Washington, I'm not sure the Army will be  able to do so. If Army leaders are unable to define the Army's long-term  mission clearly, then the defense industry will have no idea how to  proceed, other than to guess.

These factors were on display just below the surface last month at  the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA). What was striking in exhibits  was a lack of direction in where we go from here. It was as though the  industry were pointing out to the Army officers walking the aisles how  far technology has led us to this moment, yet pleading for direction on  where the industry should go from here."

http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/print/volume-24/issue-11/news/trends/the-army-s-future-mission-is-vague-leaving-industry-with-little-direction.html

                                                                                              

About the Author:

 John  Keller is editor-in-chief of Military & Aerospace Electronics  magazine, which provides extensive coverage and analysis of enabling  electronic and optoelectronic technologies in military, space, and commercial aviation applications. A member of the Military & Aerospace Electronics staff since the magazine's founding in 1989, Mr. Keller took over as chief editor in 1995.

"The Plane that Ate The Pentagon- The Politically Engineered F-35"

The F-35A at Eglin Air Force Base -"Vanity Fair"

"THE PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT (POGO)"

 The Over Budget and Behind Schedule F-35

"In "Vanity Fair", Adam Ciralsky investigates the F-35 aircraft, or Joint Strike Fighter, that was meant to streamline and update the military’s fleet of planes. When Ciralsky first saw the jet he said he “didn’t know whether to genuflect or spit.”

The plane offers hopes of a futuristic military combat system with technologies far superior to what we have now. But it’s also seven years behind schedule and millions of dollars over budget. When first conceived in 2001, each F-35 was supposed to cost $81 million. In his piece POGO’s Winslow Wheeler puts the true cost of the airplane at $219 million or more per copy:

 The Jet That Ate the Pentagon”

So what went wrong? In 2001, Lockheed Martin won a valuable government contract worth an estimated $233 billion to create the plane. Instead of testing the plane’s various aspects before production, Lockheed Martin decided to use a practice called concurrency–producing and testing the plane at the same time.

As of now, the planes can’t drop bombs and have only 2% of the necessary coding to be used in combat. During testing, pilots have ended up abandoning their futuristic helmets mid-flight due to the confusion they cause. The planes also can’t fly in inclement weather, something a  $60,000 Cessna can do.

Another basic question: why hasn’t the government stepped in to keep Lockheed Martin on track? Ciralsky believes it’s due to an expensive and brilliantly conceived manipulation of our political system.

The political process that keeps the Joint Strike Fighter airborne has never stalled. The program was designed to spread money so far and so wide—at last count, among some 1,400 separate subcontractors, strategically dispersed among key congressional districts—that no matter how many cost overruns, blown deadlines, or serious design flaws, it would be immune to termination. It was, as bureaucrats say, “politically engineered.

 POGO has reported on the problematic F-35 in the past. Recommendations include cancelling the more expensive and problematic variants of the F-35 and replacing them with proven, less expensive systems. Wheeler, though, believes the project should be abandoned all together. He wrote in Foreign Policy, “There is only one thing to do with the F-35: Junk it. America’s air forces deserve a much better aircraft, and the taxpayers deserve a much cheaper one. The dustbin awaits.”

Read the rest of the article in Vanity Fair to see how just how bad the F-35 program has become."