A Modest Proposal - The Pentagon Should Follow Boeing's Lead

 

"THE PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT By Mark Thompson

"Embarrassments like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with flubbed programs like the F-35 fighter, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and the Army’s repeated failure to replace its Bradley Fighting Vehicles rate right up there with Boeing’s blunders."

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"Boeing, the Pentagon’s #4 contractor, was once an icon of American ingenuity and industrial prowess. But it has never recovered from the tailspin following its 1997 merger with bottom-line-obsessed McDonnell Douglas. Its new Air Force Ones and aerial tankers have hit heavy turbulence. Two of its 737 MAX airliners crashed. A fuselage panel blew off one of its jets. Safety concerns about its Starliner space capsule have left two astronauts stranded in space. Its biggest union remains on strike.

Last week, Boeing decided to pull its head out of its afterburner. The decision came as the company confirmed it had lost $2 billion on defense work over the prior three months. “I think that we're better off doing less, and doing it better, than doing more and not doing it well,” brand-new Boeing boss Kelly Ortberg said October 23. To right its flailing business, Boeing plans to shed pieces of the company, likely including some of its space programs.

The U.S. and its Department of Defense should take a lesson from Ortberg. After all, embarrassments like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with flubbed programs like the F-35 fighter, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and the Army’s repeated failure to replace its Bradley Fighting Vehicles rate right up there with Boeing’s blunders.

The U.S. was the global colossus following World War II. While it accounted for 40% of the world’s economic output in 1960, that share has fallen to 26% today. Yet Washington still sees itself as the world cop, spending close to $1 trillion annually on its military, more than the next 10 countries combined. It has more than 170,000 troops based in 178 countries around the world and sold a record $238 billion in weapons to many of them last year.

The U.S. national-security state and U.S. national-security think tanks churn out reports every year warning that the Pentagon is underfunded and that defeat is just around the corner. They all flow from official documents from the White House (PDF) and Pentagon that insist the U.S. must be ready to defend pretty much anything everywhere at any time.

The United States is the only country in the world that designs its military to be able to depart one hemisphere, cross broad expanses of ocean and air space, and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival in another hemisphere,” the Congressional Research Service said in an Oct. 2 assessment (PDF) exploring the size and cost of the U.S. military. “That U.S. policymakers for the past several decades have chosen to pursue, as a key element of U.S. national strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia does not necessarily mean this goal was a correct one for the United States to pursue, or that it would be a correct one for the United States to pursue in the future.”

Boeing’s decision to trim its flaps is rooted in humility that can mature into wisdom. The U.S. should follow suit."

POGO A MODEST PROPOSAL The Pentagon should follow Boeing’s lead

Is ‘Good Enough’ Good Enough for the Pentagon?

 

"FORBES" By William Hartung

"As each generation of weapons purchased by the Pentagon becomes more expensive and more complex, the U.S. armed forces shrink accordingly.  We need to force Washington to catch up with reality, and soon, or we will all pay a horrific price in blood and treasure."

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"Writing at Responsible Statecraft, the online magazine of my organization, the Quincy Institute, my colleague Dan Grazier of the Stimson Center summarizes the dangers of the “Defense Death Spiral,” a phenomenon first warned of by a courageous group of defense reformers during the Reagan buildup of the 1980s.

The thesis is fairly simple – as each generation of weapons purchased by the Pentagon becomes more expensive and more complex, the U.S. armed forces shrink accordingly. As Grazier points out, the U.S. armed forces have half as many combat aircraft as they did in the mid-1970s, and fewer than half as many combat ships – all on a budget that is 60% higher than it was back then, adjusted for inflation. And contrary to the official story, it’s not clear that the quality of the new generation of weaponry has made up for the reduction in quantity, as evidenced by the subpar performances of major systems like the Littoral Combat Ship and the F-35.

The Pentagon’s attempt to supply weapons to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza while acquiring equipment relevant to a possible conflict with China has laid bare the flaws of the Pentagon’s current system of developing and purchasing new weapons.

For years basic items like artillery shells have been purchased in reduced quantities in favor of spending on more expensive – and more lucrative – big ticket items. But ramping up production, or replacing munitions expended during the wars in Ukraine and Middle East conflicts, is extremely difficult to do in short order because U.S. weapons are more costly and more complex than those produced by U.S. adversaries like Russia. Even the missile wars against the Houthi rebels in Yemen put the U.S. military-industrial complex at a disadvantage, as the U.S. shoots down cheap Houthi missiles with expensive U.S. interceptors.

There are two potential solutions to the death spiral. First, build simpler weapons that are good enough for the tasks at hand, but are also cheaper, more reliable, and easier to maintain and produce. This would run contrary to decades of Pentagon practice, where more technological “sophistication” is always viewed as a positive. It should be noted that the Pentagon’s “Replicator Initiative,” which is aimed at producing large numbers of cheap, capable systems in short order, is an attempt to address the death spiral issue, but the jury is out on whether this approach will succeed. And so far these new weapons – like swarms of mini-drones – are to be produced in addition to costly current generation systems, which is good news for arms makers but terrible news for taxpayers at a time when interest on the debt is now higher than the entire, enormous, Pentagon budget. We need to spend our money more wisely across the board, and the Pentagon is a good place to start.

The second way to address the death spiral is to rein in America’s runaway military strategy, which seeks the ability to fight and win wars virtually anywhere on earth while maintaining a huge global military footprint, as well as to arm multiple allies in shooting wars. We need a more hardheaded, restrained approach to when it is in the U.S. interest to use force, or to send weapons into battle zones. For example, arming Ukraine to defend itself against a Russian invasion makes sense, but since neither side is going to win total victory on the battlefield it is also urgently important to explore diplomatic options to end the conflict. In the Middle East, on the other hand, enabling Israel’s crimes in Gaza and its escalation to Lebanon and Iran is in no one’s interest, yet U.S. weapons keep flowing uninterrupted. That has to change.

There is a reckoning on the horizon regarding the goals and costs of the U.S. military apparatus. Unfortunately, the leaders of both parties remained mired in the past, like the proverbial generals fighting the last war. But this is no longer a theoretical debate. The lives and safety of millions of people here and around the world are at stake. We need to force Washington to catch up with reality, and soon, or we will all pay a horrific price in blood and treasure."

"FORBES"- Is ‘Good Enough’ Good Enough for the Pentagon?

ABOUT WILLIAM HARTUNG

I am a Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.  I am the author of Prophets of War: Lockheed Martin and the Making of the Military-Industrial Complex (Nation Books, 2011) and the co-editor, with Miriam Pemberton, of Lessons from Iraq: Avoiding the N

"THE DEBT BOMB" More Spending on Interest Than On National Defense

 

CLICK IMAGE TO ENLARGE

" THE PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT - THE BUNKER" By Mark Thompson

"Spending like a drunken sailor threatens national security. For the first time in U.S. history: the nation spent more money buying nothing ($950 billion in interest) than it did on its military ($826 billion)."

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"There it was October 8, buried discreetly on page 5 (PDF) of yet another eye-glazer from the Congressional Budget Office. In 2023, the nation spent $776 billion on its military — which buys something — and $710 billion in net interest on the public debt — which buys nothing. But in fiscal 2024, which ended September 30, those numbers flipped.

The Bunker has been decrying waste, fraud, and abuse in the U.S. military for nearly a half-century. But everyone’s three favorite whipping boys when it comes to Pentagon spending pale alongside the nearly trillion dollars we spent on interest last year. That’s money we paid to borrowers, so we didn’t have to make the tough decisions required to live within our means.

We have simply opted to kick this annual binge-spending, now approaching $36 trillion, down a generation or two so our kids and grandkids can foot the bill. When The Bunker arrived in D.C. to cover the Pentagon in 1979, the national debt was $805 billion. That’s just over 2% of what it is today. OK, Boomers. Good job! According to CBO, interest paid on the national debt grew by a stunning 34% ($240 billion) from 2023 to 2024 (PDF). Those are numbers that would make an F-35 blush.

Congress approves all government spending, but more than half of the annual budget goes to mandatory programs like Social Security and Medicare locked (for now) into law. The rest — so-called discretionary spending, appropriated annually — is basically split between the Pentagon and everything else the federal government does (education, transportation, justice, the environment, etc.). But as that mandatory spending — and interest on the national debt — grows, there’s less left over for the Pentagon and all that other stuff. Both categories need deep cuts to avert financial disaster.

Neither presidential candidate is riding to the rescue. Vice President Harris’s economic proposals could add as much as $8 trillion to the national debt over the coming decade, according to an October 7 assessment by the non-partisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. Former President Trump’s fiscal blueprints, the group projected, could add $15 trillion.

Such profligacy eventually will do more harm to U.S. national security than any foreign foe ever could." 

POGO - The Bunker: Debt Bomb

Pulitzer Prize-winner Mark Thompson has been covering the Pentagon for more than 45 years.

The Real Versus Perceived Power Of The U.S. Presidency

A NOTE FROM THE EDITOR: 

Many of us in the military combat veteran community, who have also worked for years with the federal government, are concerned about the public view of the Office of the President. Please note George Friedman bringing reality to our expectations: 

Ken Larson

"STRATFOR GEOPOLITICAL WEEKLY" By George Friedman

"The American presidency is designed to disappoint. 

What the winner actually can deliver depends upon what other institutions, nations and reality will allow him or her.

Each candidate must promise things that are beyond their power to deliver. No candidate could expect to be elected by emphasizing how little power the office actually has and how voters should therefore expect little from him. 

So candidates promise great, transformative programs.  Though the gap between promises and realities destroys immodest candidates, from the founding fathers' point of view, it protects the republic. They distrusted government in general and the office of the president in particular.

Congress, the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve Board all circumscribe the president's power over domestic life. This and the authority of the states greatly limit the president's power, just as the country's founders intended. To achieve anything substantial, the president must create a coalition of political interests to shape decision-making in other branches of the government. Yet at the same time — and this is the main paradox of American political culture — the presidency is seen as a decisive institution and the person holding that office is seen as being of overriding importance.

The president has somewhat more authority in foreign policy, but only marginally so. He is trapped by public opinion, congressional intrusion, and above all, by the realities of geopolitics. Thus, while during his 2000 presidential campaign George W. Bush argued vehemently against nation-building, once in office, he did just that (with precisely the consequences he had warned of on the campaign trail). And regardless of how he modeled his foreign policy during his first campaign, the 9/11 attacks defined his presidency. 

Similarly, Barack Obama campaigned on a promise to redefine America's relationship with both Europe and the Islamic world. Neither happened. It has been widely and properly noted how little Obama's foreign policy in action differed from George W. Bush's. It was not that Obama didn't intend to have a different foreign policy, but simply that what the president wants and what actually happens are very different things.

The power often ascribed to the U.S. presidency is overblown. But even so, people — including leaders — all over the world still take that power very seriously. They want to believe that someone is in control of what is happening. The thought that no one can control something as vast and complex as a country or the world is a frightening thought. Conspiracy theories offer this comfort, too, since they assume that while evil may govern the world, at least the world is governed. There is, of course, an alternative viewpoint, namely that while no one actually is in charge, the world is still predictable as long as you understand the impersonal forces guiding it. This is an uncomfortable and unacceptable notion to those who would make a difference in the world. For such people, the presidential race — like political disputes the world over — is of great significance.

Ultimately, the president does not have the power to transform U.S. foreign policy. Instead, American interests, the structure of the world and the limits of power determine foreign policy.

In the broadest sense, current U.S. foreign policy has been in place for about a century. During that period, the United States has sought to balance and rebalance the international system to contain potential threats in the Eastern Hemisphere, which has been torn by wars. The Western Hemisphere in general, and North America in particular, has not. No president could afford to risk allowing conflict to come to North America.

At one level, presidents do count: The strategy they pursue keeping the Western Hemisphere conflict-free matters. During World War I, the United States intervened after the Germans began to threaten Atlantic sea-lanes and just weeks after the fall of the czar. At this point in the war, the European system seemed about to become unbalanced, with the Germans coming to dominate it. In World War II, the United States followed a similar strategy, allowing the system in both Europe and Asia to become unbalanced before intervening. This was called isolationism, but that is a simplistic description of the strategy of relying on the balance of power to correct itself and only intervening as a last resort.

During the Cold War, the United States adopted the reverse strategy of actively maintaining the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere via a process of continual intervention. It should be remembered that American deaths in the Cold War were just under 100,000 (including Vietnam, Korea and lesser conflicts) versus about 116,000 U.S. deaths in World War I, showing that far from being cold, the Cold War was a violent struggle. 

The decision to maintain active balancing was a response to a perceived policy failure in World War II. The argument was that prior intervention would have prevented the collapse of the European balance, perhaps blocked Japanese adventurism, and ultimately resulted in fewer deaths than the 400,000 the United States suffered in that conflict. A consensus emerged from World War II that an "internationalist" stance of active balancing was superior to allowing nature to take its course in the hope that the system would balance itself. The Cold War was fought on this strategy.

Between 1948 and the Vietnam War, the consensus held. During the Vietnam era, however, a viewpoint emerged in the Democratic Party that the strategy of active balancing actually destabilized the Eastern Hemisphere, causing unnecessary conflict and thereby alienating other countries. This viewpoint maintained that active balancing increased the likelihood of conflict, caused anti-American coalitions to form, and most important, overstated the risk of an unbalanced system and the consequences of imbalance. Vietnam was held up as an example of excessive balancing.

The counterargument was that while active balancing might generate some conflicts, World War I and World War II showed the consequences of allowing the balance of power to take its course. This viewpoint maintained that failing to engage in active and even violent balancing with the Soviet Union would increase the possibility of conflict on the worst terms possible for the United States. Thus, even in the case of Vietnam, active balancing prevented worse outcomes. The argument between those who want the international system to balance itself and the argument of those who want the United States to actively manage the balance has raged ever since George McGovern ran against Richard Nixon in 1972.

If we carefully examine Obama's statements during the 2008 campaign and his efforts once in office, we see that he tried to move U.S. foreign policy away from active balancing in favor of allowing regional balances of power to maintain themselves. He did not move suddenly into this policy, as many of his supporters expected he would. Instead, he eased into it, simultaneously increasing U.S. efforts in Afghanistan while disengaging in other areas to the extent that the U.S. political system and global processes would allow.

Obama's efforts to transition away from active balancing of the system were seen in Europe, where he has made little attempt to stabilize the economic situation, and in the Far East, where apart from limited military repositioning there have been few changes. Syria also highlights his movement toward the strategy of relying on regional balances. The survival of Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime would unbalance the region, creating a significant Iranian sphere of influence. Obama's strategy was not to intervene beyond providing limited covert support to the opposition, but rather to allow the regional balance to deal with the problem. Obama expected the Saudis and Turks to block the Iranians by undermining al Assad, not because the United States asks them to do so but because it is in their interest to do so.

Obama's perspective drew on that of the critics of the Cold War strategy of active balancing, who maintained that without a major Eurasian power threatening hemispheric hegemony, U.S. intervention is more likely to generate anti-American coalitions and precisely the kind of threat the United States feared when it decided to actively balance. In other words, Obama does not believe that the lessons learned from World War I and World War II apply to the current global system, and that as in Syria, the global power should leave managing the regional balance to local powers.

As I have argued from the outset, the American presidency is institutionally weak despite its enormous prestige. It is limited constitutionally, politically and ultimately by the actions of others. Had Japan not attacked the United States, it is unclear that Franklin Roosevelt would have had the freedom to do what he did. Had al Qaeda not attacked on 9/11, I suspect that George W. Bush's presidency would have been dramatically different.

The world shapes U.S. foreign policy. The more active the world, the fewer choices presidents have and the smaller those choices are. Obama sought to create a space where the United States could disengage from active balancing. Doing so fell within his constitutional powers, and was politically possible, too. But whether the international system allowed him to continue along this path should he be re-elected was open to question. Jimmy Carter had a similar vision, but the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan wrecked it. George W. Bush saw his opposition to nation-building wrecked by 9/11 and had his presidency crushed under the weight of the main thing he wanted to avoid.

Presidents make history, but not on their own terms. They are constrained and harried on all sides by reality. In selecting a president, it is important to remember that candidates will say what they need to say to be elected, but even when they say what they mean, they will not necessarily be able to pursue their goals. The choice to do so simply isn't up to them.

There are two fairly clear foreign policy outlooks in this election. The degree to which the winner matters, however, is unclear, though knowing the inclinations of presidential candidates regardless of their ability to pursue them has some value.

In the end, though, the U.S. presidency was designed to limit the president's ability to rule. He or She can at most guide, and frequently cannot even do that. Putting the presidency in perspective allows us to keep our debates in perspective as well."

George Friedman on The Presidency

George Friedman is a geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs. He is the founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures, an online publication that analyzes and forecasts the course of global events. Prior to founding Geopolitical Futures, Friedman was chairman of Stratfor, the private intelligence publishing and consulting firm he founded in 1996.

Time for Congress to Challenge Years of Failed Pentagon Audits

 

"THE PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT"

By Greg Williams

"DOD Financial Management has remained on the Government Accountability Office’s High Risk list for 28 years. This cannot continue. At POGO, we’ve long argued that to pit fiscal responsibility against national security is to offer a false choice."

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"Testimony of Greg Williams, Director of the Center for Defense Information
Project On Government Oversight
for the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability
Subcommittee on Government Operations and the Federal Workforce
On “Tracking Progress: 
Examining the Department of Defense’s Financial Management Practices”

Thank you Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Mfume, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Government Operations and the Federal Workforce, for inviting POGO to offer this written testimony on the importance of achieving clean financial audits of all Department of Defense components.

My name is Greg Williams, and I am the Director of the Center for Defense Information at the Project On Government Oversight (POGO). We are an independent, nonpartisan watchdog group focused on promoting a more accountable, transparent, and effective federal government that also respects and safeguards constitutional principles. 

Our organization has a long history of advocating for more transparent and accountable spending from the Pentagon. When we were founded in 1981, we were the Project on Military Procurement. We worked with Defense Department whistleblowers to expose some of the shocking wastefulness of past Pentagon budgets.¹

In the more than 40 years since, POGO has continued our work bringing accountability, transparency, and reason to Pentagon spending. We’ve partnered with members of Congress and administrations from both parties on reforms to improve how the Defense Department budget is determined, apportioned, and executed. And we’ve long recognized how Congress — as appropriator of the Pentagon budget and provider of critical oversight — plays a crucial role in enacting rational defense policy. 

One important point of consensus between Democrats and Republicans and between Congress and the Pentagon is that the Department of Defense must be able to track its expenditures and assets in such a way that its effectiveness and efficiency can be measured by both the executive and legislative branches. This kind of quantitative, objective information is the necessary foundation for any serious debate on policy. Announcing the first Pentagon-wide audit in 2017, then-Comptroller of the Defense Department David L. Norquist got it right when he said, “It is important that the Congress and the American people have confidence in DoD’s management of every taxpayer dollar.”²  

At the time of that announcement, Norquist also committed to annual Pentagon audits starting in 2018, to be issued on November 15 of each year, which would allow the public to see where their Defense Department funding actually goes. Unfortunately, the Pentagon has never been able to make good on this commitment. 

In FY 2023, it failed its sixth audit in a row.³ When asked to account for their share of nearly $4 trillion in assets, 18 of 29 Pentagon components could not do so.⁴ Indeed, the problem has gotten marginally worse instead of better, with 62.1% of Pentagon components receiving a disclaimer of opinion on their FY 2023 audits (issued “when auditors were unable to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide an opinion on the financial statements”) versus 61.5% in FY 2022.⁵ The problem is longstanding: DOD Financial Management has remained on the Government Accountability Office’s High Risk list for 28 years.⁶

This cannot continue. At POGO, we’ve long argued that to pit fiscal responsibility against national security is to offer a false choice. We can have a more effective military at a lower cost, but to do so will require an intentional effort from both the Pentagon and Congress. A closer look at a few concerning Pentagon programs offers a clear example of where we’re going wrong and highlights the pressing need for acquisition reform.

• The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program: This $141 billion program, designed to replace our current ICBMs, has seen costs soar over 81% through its program cycle. Yet even absent reliable financial data, Congress’s support for this program seems unwavering.⁷
• The Constellation frigate program: This $22 billion program is running three years behind schedule, a delay the Government Accountability Office (GAO) attributes at least in part to “the Navy’s decision to begin construction before the design was complete.”⁸ As my colleague Dylan Hedtler-Gaudette recently testified, “Agreeing to a contract for a critical program like Constellation without first having a design for that program seems like, at best, acquisition and procurement malpractice.”⁹
• The F-35 Lightning II fighter program: At an investment of nearly $2 trillion, the F-35 program has been so plagued by cost overruns, delays, and performance problems that there is not space to list them all here.¹⁰ At the same time, the Department of Defense inspector general identified the Joint Strike Fighter Program (the F-35) as one of 10 “weaknesses” in the FY 2022 audit:

The [Joint Strike Fighter, or] JSF Program Office was unable to verify the completeness and value of the JSF Program assets, and the assets were not in an accountable property system of record. Not only were the auditors unable to perform the necessary procedures to conclude on the JSF property balances, but they also could not quantify the extent of the misstatement.¹¹

If the Pentagon can’t or won’t track new, high-profile programs like the F-35, what hope is there for older, less scrutinized programs? 

In this written testimony, I propose reforms that will increase accountability and transparency in Pentagon acquisition and procurement. POGO has advocated for these reforms before, most recently before the Subcommittee on National Security, the Border, and Foreign Affairs, and we see them as a first step toward more effective defense spending.¹²  We believe that each of these reforms has merit, and taken together they would constitute significant progress toward our goal of a strong, effective military at a significantly lower cost. 

We encourage Congress and the Biden administration to take the following steps:

 Recommendations:

• Enact legislation that requires a successful Defense Department audit and imposes penalties for failure to do so. An audit is not the end-all-be-all in terms of fiscal responsibility and budgetary best practice, but it is a necessary element of a broader reform effort. The fact that the Pentagon has failed audits for successive years is emblematic of deeper, systemic financial pain points. All DOD components finally passing audits could be the catalyst that gets the Department back on solid and sustainable financial footing while spotlighting key acquisition and procurement problems.
• Congress should more frequently and more assertively conduct oversight of Pentagon spending and programming, paying particular attention to which Pentagon components have clean audits. While acquisition and procurement problems plague the Pentagon itself, Congress has a vital role to play in monitoring how defense spending and policy are being implemented on the ground. In our view, Congress has not fulfilled this role sufficiently over the years. It is time to begin more regularly asking hard questions and making hard choices through congressional oversight activities, especially for those DOD components without clean audits.
• Congress should use the “power of the purse” to operationalize necessary changes. In addition to conducting rigorous, real-time oversight, Congress has a potent tool at its disposal: funding. This tool should be used more effectively and more often to compel cooperation and change behavior when it comes to the Pentagon’s acquisition and procurement decision-making and execution, especially when major acquisitions and platforms fail to meet deadlines, exceed cost parameters, and generally over-promise and under-deliver.

It’s clear that the Defense Department is not yet equipped to pass an audit on its own — it’s time for Congress to step in and force the issue. The good news is that today, both the House and the Senate are considering bipartisan bills that would require a clean audit from the Pentagon.¹³

I want to thank you for inviting my testimony for this hearing, and for committing yourselves to bringing more accountability and transparency to Pentagon spending. The reforms suggested above are sensible, achievable steps that Congress can take to hold the Defense Department accountable and ensure that the tax dollars we dedicate to national security are actually working to keep us safe."

 PGOG - Time To Challenge Years of Failed Pentagon Audits

"Odyssey of Armaments" - Inside Pentagon Procurement from Vietnam to Iraq

 "Odyssey of Armaments " By Ken Larson

"I hope this FREE account of my 36-years in warfare and weapons programs is useful to those concerned about the posture of the United States in the world today. I learned that the only thing wars decide is how many have died, who is left and who must pay the bills.

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"The U.S. is presently involved in a military run-up like I experienced in Vietnam as a combat soldier and very similar to what I lived through on defense weapons programs in support for "Conflicts" in The Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan.

We have now entered similar quagmires in the Middle East and Ukraine. Our "Big 5" defense contractors and their stockholders contemplate, with watering mouths, exponential weapons sales, while others, like me, who have seen this before, shudder at the prospective deaths of our young soldiers who may pay the price.

In 1968, I came home from serving two US Army tours in Vietnam, having been awarded five medals, including a Bronze Star. During my second tour I acquired Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Depression. Treatment would not become available for either ailment until the mid to late 70's. Returning to the University of Minnesota at Morris, I found that most of my former classmates were either facing the military draft or were violently against the war. I was not their favorite person.

Feeling isolated and alone, I was unable to relate to my family due to untreated Depression and PTSD. Disillusioned with school, I moved to Minneapolis Minnesota and began a career in the Defense Industrial Complex that would span over three decades from 1969 through 2005. I thought that through working on defense systems, I could contribute to the quality and quantity of weapons that the next generation would take to war. Given a clearly defined mission and the best armaments and systems in the world, I believed that another Vietnam could be avoided for the American Soldier. In pursuit of this goal, I participated in the design, development and production of 25 large scale weapons systems under Federal Government and Foreign Military Sales Contracts. I worked in several different disciplines for the companies that produced these weapons, negotiating and controlling the associated contracts with procurement agencies in the US Armed Forces and in 16 allied countries.

By the time treatment for PTSD and Depression became available, I had such high security clearances that had I been treated for these disorders, the US Government would have revoked my clearances and my career would have ended or would have been sharply curtailed. This quandary led to my journey through the Defense Industrial Complex. I found that accepting extreme challenges and succeeding at them became a way to displace PTSD and elevate depressive moods. For extended periods of time this method of self-management led to a satisfying, although somewhat adventurous and diversified life. However, down periods always occurred, especially after the latest challenge had been met. A new challenge was then required. Family, friends and acquaintances were often puzzled by the frequent changes in my job sites and locations. Two marriages fell by the wayside.

I became known in the industry as a front-end loaded trouble shooter on complex projects, installing processes and business systems required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. These systems included estimating and pricing, proposal preparation, contract administration, cost and schedule control, program management, design to cost, life cycle cost, export management and other specialties unique to US Government Contracts. Getting through government source selection boards and surviving audits during competition was a significant challenge for defense contractors. Installing required business systems after contract award, under ambitious cost, schedule and technical conditions, was an even more difficult undertaking. I became a leader in the problem solving and creative processes necessary to win contracts and successfully fulfill them. When my mood demanded it, there was always a new job, with a new challenge and a subsequent elevated feeling from success. It was not unusual for a career professional in the Defense Industry to move regularly with the ebb and flow of competitive procurements and associated government funding shifts.

I came to know many of the career military and civil servants who managed the government procurement process. These individuals never went away, regardless of elections or politics. They developed the alternatives from which elected officials must choose. The American Public rarely heard from these powerful insiders, while the insiders slanted the choices supplied to elected officials in a self-perpetuating manner. I recognized the mirror image way in which procuring agencies and defense contractors organized their operations on the largest systems acquisitions. Key executives regularly moved back and forth between government and industry. I often observed the short, happy life of a defense company program manager. Appointed by the powerful insiders to head a single project, he had no authority over company resources, he perpetually competed with other program managers for the same talent pool and he always took the heat from management when things did not go well. His counterpart in the government quarters had similar experiences. I often supported several program managers at the same time. They all were desperate to achieve success. They each believed they had the most important program in the company.

In early 2005, approaching age sixty, I found myself unable to self-manage an extremely deep depressive episode. The journey had simply wound down. This situation nearly resulted in an end to my life. Recovering with help from my family and the US Veteran's Administration, I now reside in a veteran's home, volunteering to Small, Veteran-Owned, Women-Owned and Minority-Owned businesses that are pursuing contracts with the Federal Government. I provide advice, alternatives and business examples based on my experiences. It is refreshing to witness the successes of small, motivated and flexible companies. I believe they deserve every special consideration they have achieved under our system of government.

After thirty-six years in the Defense Industrial Complex my greatest satisfaction came from watching "Stormin Norman" and his Gulf War Forces defeat the Iraqi Army in Operation Desert Storm. They used the Abrams Main Battle Tank, the Hellfire Missile and an array of communications and other systems on which I worked. I have had the privilege of meeting several young soldiers coming back from current conflicts in the Middle East who have praised these systems for their life saving performances.

Operation Desert Storm had a clearly defined mission to liberate a small country from an aggressor. We accomplished the mission utilizing the best weapons in the world. Unfortunately, we did not leave the area. The lessons of Vietnam have not been remembered and once again political factors govern our presence in several countries. This time it is the European Theater and Ukraine as well as a return to the Middle East in support of Israel. We have ventured around the world, including the African Continent on numerous occasions under the 911 Patriot Act that is still on the books allowing unilateral war decisions by the President of the United States without seeking approval from Congress and without informing the public. Technology is underway using AI for rapid weapons development geared for urban warfare with drones, unmanned vehicles, state of the art sensors and remote standoff capabilities.

How much longer can we afford to be the "World's Policeman"? We are spending billions per year for defense, homeland security and nation building. The largest corporations selling to our government are no more than extensions of our government in the cloak of industry. They are not in the business of making money for the stockholder. They are in the business of spending money for the government. Recent consolidation in the Defense Industrial Complex has dramatically reduced competition. Only public laws mandating a twenty-three per cent allocation of Federal Contract Funding to small business have kept diversification in the mix. Even then, much of the moneys that flow to small business go through a select group of large business prime contractors who add their respective overhead and general administrative expense to the small business cost and pass it on to the government.

My odyssey was driven by a need to manage illnesses acquired in warfare. I found a way to deal with the maladies for years by spreading myself thin and accepting every new challenge. I thrilled at success and moved on after defeat, pursuing a misguided goal. Out of necessity I have now been forced to look inward, wind down to a smaller perspective, take care of my health - begin serving the little guy.

Perhaps it is time for our country to consider a similar transition before the risks promulgated by our trillion dollar warfare activity, geopolitical and economic, take us to a very dark place like the one when our country struggled to give "Give Peace a Chance" (John Lennon) .

Give Peace A Chance

The full book, “Odyssey of Armaments” can be read FREE online and also downloaded FREE in pdf format here: Odyssey Of Armaments

The Road To A $1 Trillion U.S. Defense Budget

“NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL” By Brent M. Eastwood

“A trillion here and a trillion there. Pretty soon, you are talking about…a big problem. That is the projected defense budget cost in the coming years—a cool one trillion—and perhaps even more.“

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“In 2022, the defense budget was still only 3 percent of GDP. During the Cold War, it was much higher. So, comparing the level of spending to the size of the economy is a different way to look at it.

But that top-level number is certainly eye-watering.

Even though the United States is not currently in a major shooting war, it is still confronted by the growth of great power and rising power rivalries with China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, plus contingencies in the Middle East. That means more spending is required to keep up.

Let’s examine the reasons for high costs and where the U.S. defense budget could be headed in the years to come, especially in the era of great power competition.

Major Defense Hardware Programs Are What People Criticize the Most

Most people associate defense spending with expensive major-end items, and these are budget busters. Existing programs like the F-35 have been a money pit. New toys such as the B-21 Raider stealth bomber, the newfangled Next-generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, and the Ford-class aircraft carrier are costly. All acquisition programs cost $146 billion in 2023.

Personnel Costs Are Rampant

Other costs that are not readily apparent are personnel costs for the U.S. military uniformed service and the civilian service for the Pentagon. Salaries are expensive. Healthcare costs for active duty personnel and their families are out of this world. Retirement pensions also have heavy sunken costs in the budget. That’s a total of $184 billion a year and rising.

Parochial Interest Over Defense Jobs and Economic Development

The United States is also doing what it hasn’t done since the Cold War: bringing on new weapons, funding legacy systems, and spending more on research and development—all at once.

Something has to give because congressional lawmakers and politicians of all stripes want defense jobs in their neighborhoods, and that means continued spending on all of the above.

Overseas Operations Are Not Cheap

The Pentagon has other costs. There is a sprawling number of overseas installations and bases, plus new base construction and sustainability on our continent. There is an unending supply of money that goes to special operations forces. There is maintenance of existing weapons. Let’s round up and call that around $55 billion.

Ammunition, missiles, and bombs are expensive. Peacekeeping operations and disaster relief are also part of the budget equation.

Funding Allies for Their Wars

We may not be fighting any major wars, but allies are. Tens of billions of dollars have gone to Ukraine for its war against Russia. Money goes out the door to Israel to fight its war against Hamas. Funds are also required to help Egypt with its defense forces, plus aid to several other countries. The estimated cost is $100 billion.

What to Do With Old Hardware and Ammunition?

Other costs that people don’t consider are destroying old equipment, storing out-of-date hardware, and placing retired airplanes in a “Boneyard” in Arizona. All of this costs money.

This totals $916 billion in 2023, or 13 percent of the federal budget. That’s twice as much as all of the NATO countries and 40 percent of all spending worldwide. In a few years, it seems sure we will top over $1 trillion.

Cutting the Budget? How?

Where can the United States cut the budget? You may have noticed that I am a military analyst who is often in love with big-ticket military hardware. I can find a reason to fund numerous new programs and sustain legacy weapons. So, I’m probably guilty on the defense acquisition side for an advocate to plus-up spending.

Nobody wants to cut the pay of active-duty or reserve forces. All earn their healthcare, housing, and retirement pensions, and there is no political will to change that. Look for personnel costs to increase every year.

To be a world leader, the United States needs to maintain a forward presence worldwide. Treaties require some of this, such as the need for bases in South Korea, like the sprawling Camp Humphreys, which houses a big part of the American presence on the peninsula.

Military R&D Is Important Too

We need research and development, not only for the future of the military but also to sustain the defense industrial base that has spawned great dual-use technological transformations and seed funding for GPS and the Internet.

Many Watchdogs Already Exist

How about cutting waste, fraud, and abuse or ending bad acquisition systems?

Federal government agencies such as the Defense Contract Management Agency and the Government Accountability Office already closely monitor most defense programs. Congress, nonprofits, think tanks, and the defense media also monitor potential overspending.

With the 24/7 internet-driven press oversight and social media, there are few secrets about defense wastefulness and many watchful eyes to shine a light on problems. One could argue that programs should be eliminated early, such as the terrible U.S. Littoral Combat Ship or the questionable V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. But these cancellations would not make much of a difference in the overall budget.

Can the United States Back off on Equipment?

A group of non-profits and think tanks are calling for more restraint in foreign policy and fighting American overreach in defense spending. But they have difficulty breaking through the noise in Washington, DC, with so many other domestic problems that need solutions.

The Defense Train Keeps Chugging Along

So, the defense train is almost unstoppable. We are in for a penny and in for a pound nowadays. Don’t look for Republicans and Democrats to cut military spending that much. The price is too baked into the system. We are going to see trillion-dollar defense budgets in the coming years, and most people will not even notice. The Federal Reserve Bank can continue to print money to fund the defense budget, and a high deficit is not enough to scare the public off from supporting or ignoring more defense spending. Buckle in for a bumpy ride.”

About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood

Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare, plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for U.S. Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former U.S. Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.   

WRITTEN BYBrent M. Eastwood

Dr. Brent M. Eastwood is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and Foreign Policy/ International Relations.

VA Hospitals Earn High Marks In New Federal Ratings

 

MILITARY.COM” By Patricia Kime

“A new quality assessment of U.S. hospitals by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services gave nearly 58% of Department of Veterans Affairs medical centers the highest four- or five-star ratings — down 9% from 2023.

The Department also announced Tuesday that its hospitals outperformed non-VA facilities on patient satisfaction surveys, which gave 79% of VA hospitals four or five stars, compared with 40% of non-VA hospitals.”

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“The VA scores were still significantly higher than private medical centers, only 40% of which earned four or five stars. 

Despite the drop in overall scores from last year, VA Under Secretary for Health Dr. Shereef Elnahal told reporters Friday that the ratings were “great news” for veterans and the VA employees who treat them.

“We’re offering more care to more veterans than ever before, and we are exceeding on all metrics, both patient experience metrics and overall hospital quality and patient safety metrics, when we are comparing apples to apples with civilian-sector hospitals,” Elnahal said.

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, or CMS, examines hospital mortality, safety of care, readmission rates, patient experience, and timeliness and effectiveness of care to award stars on a five-point scale.

This year, 35 VA hospitals earned a five-star quality rating, one more than last year, and 15 of the 35 also earned five stars on CMS’ patient survey ratings.

“Veterans [are] able to see how VA hospitals are comparing to other options they may have in the civilian sector,” Elnahal said. “[If] they have Medicare or private health insurance, they can get care at both options. What this will allow is for them to compare, including — if they qualify for community care, as supported by VA — choices in the civilian sector.”

The new star ratings, which can be found on the Care Compare website, mark the second year the VA was included in the database by CMS, a federal agency within the Department of Health and Human Services. The agency gave star ratings to 109 VA facilities, with the remaining VA hospitals or medical centers not being rated, either because they don’t meet qualification thresholds or the level of metrics needed to assess them.

CMS does not assess specialty hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, or some inpatient care facilities, such as psychiatric hospitals.

In addition to the 35 VA hospitals that earned five stars, 27 earned four stars, 23 earned three stars, 14 earned two stars and 10 earned one star — up from nine last year but with fluctuations on the one-star list.

Elnahal said the Veterans Health Administration considers these metrics, alongside its internal monitoring systems, when reviewing hospital performance.

“What we do is offer focused attention and support from our headquarters, national improvement office, to those medical centers scoring at the lowest levels on this scale and on our internal scale,” Elnahal said. “What this does is it highlights essentially more medical centers that maybe our internal system isn’t flagging, and ultimately allows us to get an up-to-date picture as more comprehensive of where we are on this.”

The facilities receiving the lowest ratings were the VA Southern Arizona Health Care System in Tucson; Bay Pines VA Health Care System and West Palm Beach VA Medical Center in Florida; Overton Brooks VA Medical Center in Shreveport, Louisiana; VA New Jersey Health Care System; Syracuse VA Medical Center and VA New York Harbor Health Care System in New York; VA Pittsburgh Health Care System; Providence VA Medical Center in Rhode Island; and VA Caribbean Health Care System in San Juan, Puerto Rico.

New to the one-star list were the VA medical centers in Tucson, New Jersey, Syracuse and New York Harbor Health Care. Those that received one star on last year’s list but have since increased their ratings include the James J. Peters VA Medical Center in The Bronx, New York; New Mexico VA Health Care System in Albuquerque; and the Memphis VA Medical Center, Tennessee, all of which are now two-star facilities.

A one-star rating signifies that the facilities performed well below the average for specific measurements, such as death rates for patients with heart failure, surgical complications and pneumonia; readmission rates for certain ailments; hospital-acquired infections; patient satisfaction; and more.

The data for this year’s star ratings was collected between July 2019 and March 2023, according to the VA.

According to CMS, its reviewers rated 4,658 hospitals in the U.S., and of those, just 8% received five stars. Star ratings are “limited in scope,” CMS officials said, by the data sources from which they are derived. 

Among the criticisms of the rankings from advocacy groups and industry associations such as the American Association for Physician Leadership, is that they don’t take into account the socioeconomic status of patients or the surrounding community, which may not have access to routine health care and have worse health outcomes for acute and chronic conditions.

CMS also crunches the numbers in a way that may put smaller facilities or hospitals that have a low number of cases or incidents that meet its eligibility criteria at a disadvantage when it comes to the ratings.

VA officials have noted, however, that surveys of veteran patients not only show positive response to VA services but that trust in VA health care remains high.

“Our most recent outpatient survey results show that 92% of veterans trust the care that they get in our clinics and ambulatory settings, so both inpatient and outpatient trust are at all-time highs, and we are beating the private-sector averages on inpatient trust,” Elnahal said.

In a statement released Tuesday, VA Secretary Denis McDonough said the metrics help the VA convey its message that it provides quality health services.

“We’ve made millions more veterans eligible for VA health care under the PACT Act –– and now, we want to make sure that every one of them gets timely access to the world-class care they deserve,” McDonough said. “Whenever a veteran sets foot in a VA facility, we want them to know that they are getting the very best care this nation has to offer — and we won’t ever settle for anything less.”

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Patricia Kime focuses on military personnel and veterans issues for Military.com, reporting on health care, military families, justice and benefits. She has covered military issues for decades, reporting on combat-related illnesses and injuries, the Defense Department and the Department of Veterans Affairs.