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Monday, April 27, 2026

Revelations From The Pentagon’s 2027 Fiscal Year Budget Request Briefings

 


"NATIONAL DEFENSE MAGAZINE" By Stew Magnuson, Editor In Chief

"Where officials from the Air Force, Navy and Army intend to spend what they called a “historic and once in a generation” $1.5 trillion budget so they will not have to make compromises between modernization and readiness. They can have it all."

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"The Defense Department in 2025 did not hold a big rollout for the fiscal year 2026 budget request.

This year marked a return to normalcy as the Pentagon’s acting comptroller and officials from the Air Force, Navy and Army all sat down with reporters in four separate briefings to explain where they intend to spend what they called a “historic and once in a generation” $1.5 trillion budget.

The headline: the unprecedented funding boost will allow the services to not have to make compromises between modernization and readiness. They can have it all.

The officials also noted that the budget was in the works long before the outset of Operation Epic Fury, and the war did not have any impact on the budget request. Any additional expenses would be included in a reconciliation bill. How much would be in that pot is still unknown, they said, but its passing would push the $1.5 trillion mark even higher.

Here are 10 other interesting tidbits from a day of press briefings.

• Boosting the defense industrial base was a reoccurring theme throughout the briefings. Part of that is delivering on the promise of multi-year orders. “We're going to give them a massive order, we're going to sustain it over time, and then we're going to have industry put forward the money to actually invest in their facilities,” said Jules Hurst III, performing the duties of the undersecretary of war-comptroller. The caveat is if industry fails to deliver on increased production, “there will be penalties for them,” he warned.

• Since prime contractor Lockheed Martin only has so much capacity to deliver F-35 jet fighters, the budget prioritizes purchases for U.S. forces. The number slated for foreign customers will be reduced. Those numbers are to be determined.

• The budget funds a study to look at the possibility of building a fifth public shipyard and to identify possible locations.

• The Marine Corps remains committed to buying the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle while the Army’s decision in 2025 to end its procurement stands, although it might procure a few for specialized missions such as counter-drone operations, service officials said. Ironic, since it was one of the few Army-led acquisition programs that pretty much came in on time and on budget.

• The Navy is already spending $837 million in the current budget cycle on research and development for the so-called Trump-class battleship, with a goal of beginning construction in 2028. The service is seeking an additional $3.9 billion in R&D and $43.5 billion over the next five years to build the first three ships. A Navy official pushed back on the narrative of it being a “Trump vanity project” and reiterated the talking point that the service had already identified the need for a ship larger than guided-missile destroyers.

• Two recent announcements came too late for the Department of the Air Force to factor them into budget documents. The first was the un-cancellation — again — of the A-10 Thunderbolt II, better known as the Warthog, which has seen action in Operation Epic Fury. Its success there bought the venerated airframe a reprieve until at least 2030. The Space Force also finally pulled the plug on the OCX program, the ground segment for the new generation of GPS satellites. After more than 15 years of development, it came to an ignoble end. What comes next for these two programs is to be determined, an official said.

• The Air Force's Next-Generation Aerial Refueling System is not a thing anymore. There is $13 million in the request for a new initiative called “Advanced Tanker Systems,” which will look at alternatives “to offer more options … and to make sure that our future advanced tanker systems are more resilient and can operate in contested environments,” a service official said.

• At long last, the Army’s two-decade quest to field a Bradley Fighting Vehicle replacement seems to be coming to an end, as the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle moves out of the research-and-development account and into procurement. The budget request has $547 million for the first 19 vehicles, along with the goal of procuring a total of 326 by 2031.

• Similar to the long journey to replace the Bradley, the end is in sight for the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter replacement — formerly known as the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft. Now known as MV-75 Cheyenne II, the Army budget request of $2.1 billion for the program calls for accelerated delivery of the aircraft with a goal of equipping the first unit by 2030.

• The overall Defense Department briefing touted big investments in the Golden Dome missile defense shield. But details on how much was being spent by the individual services — particularly the Space Force and Air Force contributions — were not forthcoming, with all budget questions being referred to Golden Dome Director Space Force Gen. Michael Guetlein. Missile Defense Agency budget briefings have been held in years’ past, but not this one."

Top 10 Interesting Revelations from the Pentagon’s 2027 Fiscal Year Budget Request Briefings

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:










Stew Magnuson is the Editor in Chief of National Defense Magazine

Sunday, April 26, 2026

The Awful Arithmetic Of Our Wars

 

"DEFENSE ONE" By Peter W. Singer

"The math of current battlefields remains literally orders of magnitude beyond what our budget plans to spend, our industry plans to build, our acquisitions system is able to contract, and thus what our military will deploy."

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 "At the lowest point of the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln characterized the core factor between victory and defeat as finding a general who understood the “awful arithmetic” of war. War is a contest of blood and treasure; each can, and must, ultimately be counted and measured. It has been the same for every conflict before and after. 

Yet this arithmetic is constantly changing, and never faster than right now. If the United States cannot update its calculations to properly reflect our new era, our failure will not just cost us blood and treasure, but will drive us toward defeat.

Cost imposition has long been a tenet of U.S. strategy. During the Cold War, the U.S. launched expensive programs such as stealth and Star Wars not just for their tactical value, but to send a strategic signal to the Kremlin: neither your economy nor your war machine can keep up. Gorbachev, persuaded, gave up the decades-long competition with the U.S. 

The very same concept of cost imposition was also elemental to the most celebrated operations of the past year. In Operation Spider’s Web, Ukraine used inexpensive drones, reportedly costing less than $500 each, to damage strategic bombers worth many millions of dollars, degrading Russia’s long-range strike capabilities for years to come. Similarly, in Operation Rising Lion, cheap Israeli drones took out Iranian surface-to-air missiles and radars, paving the way for the destruction of command and nuclear facilities worth tens of billions of dollars. In each, the tactical became the strategic through new operational concepts that leveraged the new math of new technologies. 

Now contrast this with our own approaches, which overwhelmingly rely on sophisticated but costly overmatch.

The most lauded U.S. operation of 2025 was Operation Midnight Hammer, our followup to Rising Lion. One estimate put its cost at $196 million, from combining B-2 bomber’s nearly $160,000 per flight hour and Tomahawk missiles' rough price of $1.87 million apiece. (It does not count the initial purchase of the seven B-2 Bombers that cost $2.1 billion each, nor the $4.3 billion submarine that launched the missiles.) 

Perhaps it was worth spending one-fifth of a billion dollars to damage Iranian nuclear facilities, but the numbers in Operation Rough Rider—the strikes against the Houthis last spring—illustrate the problem more starkly. The Pentagon spent roughly $5 billion on munitions and operating costs to stop attacks on Red Sea shipping, which simply started back up this month.

The same awful arithmetic haunts the current operations in the Caribbean against the Venezuela-based, government-connected Cartel de los Soles. The entity was recently designated by the Trump administration as a foreign terrorist organization, as part of its argument that US forces are engaged in an “armed conflict.” The cartel was declared by the Department of Justice to be the hub of a cocaine transport network, shipping a reported street value of between $6.25 billion and $8.75 billion in drugs (the cartel gets an unknown, but clearly lesser, percentage of that overall value in actual profit). 

To battle this foe, the United States has assembled a fleet that cost at least $40 billion to buy in total. The carrier Ford alone cost $4.7 billion to develop and $12.9 billion to build. The fleet is backed by at least 83 aircraft of assorted types, including 10 F-35Bs ($109 million apiece), seven Predator drones ($33 million each), three P-8 Poseidons ($145 million per), and at least one AC-130J gunship ($165 million). To be sure, all of these assets will continue to serve long after Operation Southern Spear is wound down, but this is how we are using the investment. 

But the current cost of operations and expendables hardly tells a better story. The Ford alone costs about $8 million a day to run. The F-35s and AC-130J cost about $40,000 per flight hour; the P-8s, about $30,000; the Reapers, about $3,500.

Analysis of the strike videos on the 21 boats show that U.S. forces have fired AGM-176 Griffins ($127,333 apiece in 2019), Hellfires (running about $150,000 to $220,000) and potentially GBU-39B Small Diameter Bombs ($40,000). In some cases, they are reportedly firing four munitions per strike: “twice to kill the crew and twice more to sink it.”

All this is arrayed to sink motorboats, 21 at last report. One of the boats was described by Pentagon officials as a 39-foot Flipper-type vessel with four 200-horsepower engines. New ones go for about $400,000 on Boats.com, but the old, open top motorbots in the videos are obviously well below that in cost. Their crews have been reported as making $500 per trip.

Put in comparison, the cost of the US naval fleet deployed is at least five times what the cartel makes in smuggling. The air fleet deployed costs at least another two times more.  It is roughly 5,000 times the cost of the suspected drug boats that have been destroyed. Indeed, just the cost of operating the Ford off Venezuela for a single day has still not yet equaled the maximum cost the cartel paid for the boats it has lost.

In the air, the U.S. military spent roughly 66,000 times more to buy each unmanned drone in the operation than the cartel paid each man that the unmanned drones killed. The US spent between 80 to 300 times more for each bomb or missile it has used than the cartel paid each man killed by those bombs or missiles. 

The math is arguably even worse when we're on the defense. 

In September, a wave of 19 Russian drones crossed into Polish airspace.. The Gerbera-type drones cost as little as $10,000—so cheap that they are often used as decoys to misdirect and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. NATO countered with a half-billion-dollar response force of F-35s, F-16s, AWACS radar planes, and helicopters, which shot down four of the drones with $1.6-million AMRAAM missiles. 

This is a bargain compared to how challenging U.S. forces have found it to defend against Houthi forces using this same cheap tech. Our naval forces have fired a reported 120 SM-2, 80 SM-6, and 20 SM-3 missiles, costing about $2.1 million, $3.9 million, and over $9.6 million each. And this is to defend against a group operating out of the 187th-largest economy in the world, able to fire mere hundreds of drones and missiles. Our supposed pacing challenge, China, has an economy that will soon be the largest in the world and a combined national industrial and military acquisition plan to be able to fire munitions by the millions. 

Even in America’s best-laid plans for future battlefields, there is a harsh reality that is too often ignored. The math of current battlefields remains literally orders of magnitude beyond what our budget plans to spend, our industry plans to build, our acquisitions system is able to contract, and thus what our military will deploy. 

As a point of comparison, Ukraine is on pace to build, buy, and use over four million drones this year. The U.S. Army, meanwhile, aims to acquire 50,000 drones next year—about 1.25 percent of the Ukrainian total. In its most optimistic plans, it hopes to be able to acquire 1 million drones “within the next two to three years.” ​​ 

When you spend orders of magnitude more than your foe, you are in what is known as a “losing equation.” And if we don’t change this math, we will need an update to Norm Augustine’s infamous “law” of defense acquisitions. Back in 1979, Augustine calculated that if the Pentagon couldn’t curtail the cost curve of its purchasing, by 2054 we wouldn’t be able to afford a single plane. 

The 2025 version is that if we don't master the new math of the battlefield, we won’t be able to afford to win a single battle."

The awful arithmetic of our wars

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

 Peter W. Singer

P.W. Singer is Strategist at New America and the author of multiple books on technology and security, including Wired for War, Ghost Fleet, Burn-In, and LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media.



Saturday, April 25, 2026

What Americans Are Getting Wrong About Veterans

 

"TASK AND PURPOSE" By Haley Britzky

 "As of 2018, less than 10% of adults in the U.S. were veterans, according to a 2021 report from the Pew Research Center. The number of living veterans is only going to decrease, the same report said; by 2046, “there will be around 12.5 million veterans. 

While the population dwindles, veterans continue to play an outsized role in innumerable facets of American society, from pop culture to politics. And perhaps it’s because of that dwindling population, and because fewer Americans actually know a military veteran, that many misconceptions persist about who veterans are."

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"A 2020 report from the U.S. Census Bureau said there were nearly 18 million veterans alive in the U.S. — including over three million veterans each of the Global War on Terror and Gulf War, six million veterans of the Vietnam War, and roughly a million veterans of the Korean War. There are fewer than 200,000 U.S. veterans of World War II alive today.

Task & Purpose asked its readers what some of the most common misunderstandings about veterans are. Many people said they’re uncomfortable with being thanked for their service. Some said they wish people knew that just because they served in the military doesn’t make their opinion on anything more valid or qualified. A few readers pointed out how often people assume their male significant other is a veteran — instead of them, a woman. 

“How many of us do people think there are?” one Twitter user said. “I keep hearing all these magic solutions that sound like there are whole cities of vets standing by.” 

From not all veterans fitting into one political ideology to the fact that there are many veterans out there who never saw combat, there are plenty of misunderstandings veterans say they have to explain to their civilian friends and neighbors. 

Just like the general public, the veteran population is diverse 

The military and veteran population is a subset of American society, and like American society, they are diverse in more ways than just gender or background, but also in their beliefs, opinions, and lived experience. 

According to the Department of Veterans Affairs, there are more than 2 million female veterans in the U.S., and women are the “fastest grouping group” of veterans, expected to make up 18% of the veteran community by 2040. Data from the VA also says that the number of veterans who are minorities is only going to increase over the next few decades. 

For example, nearly 13% of veterans are Black and 8% are Hispanic. By 2045, those percentages are expected to increase to 15% and 12%, respectively. 

And when it comes to veterans’ opinions and beliefs, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Like their civilian counterparts, veterans are Republicans and Democrats and everything in between. 

An October 2020 poll from Military Times said while older veterans supported then-President Donald Trump for re-election, younger veterans “significantly [preferred] former Vice President Joe Biden as the next commander in chief.” Another Military Times poll just two months prior saw a drop in support among active-duty troops for Trump.

Not every veteran is a hardened combat vet — and not every veteran has even seen combat

It’s obvious why Hollywood primarily makes movies and television shows about hard-charging combat troops, operators, and high-stakes missions — a movie about an administrative assistant probably wouldn’t break any box-office records. But there is no shortage of non-combat jobs that, while they may not be as exciting to the average civilian, are just as important. 

Take for example someone who works in finance. It may not be the most thrilling job in the military, but service members and their families would certainly notice if their pay is late or incorrect. 

A 2019 survey from the Pew Research Center found that roughly 40% of veterans were never deployed during their military service. That ratio changes for the Global War on Terror generation, of which 77% of veterans said they deployed at least once. Veterans in the post-9/11 generation are also more likely than their immediate predecessors to have seen combat: 49% of GWOT veterans had combat experience, compared to 24% of veterans who served before Sept. 11, according to the Pew Research Center report. 

And ultimately, whether someone saw combat or not doesn’t determine their status as a veteran. They still served. 

Not every veteran has post-traumatic stress

One of the biggest myths of military service is that everyone leaves their respective branch with post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD. According to the VA, between 11 and 20% of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans have PTSD “in a given year” — meaning the vast majority do not.

Nevertheless, a 2021 study found that of roughly 2,000 U.S. adults surveyed, 67% said they believe most veterans have PTSD; 26% of respondents also said they think the majority of people with PTSD are dangerous. That couldn’t be further from the truth. Experiencing PTSD doesn’t make someone broken, or mean they can’t function in a public place or civilian work environment. 

“[W]e know a lot of people that serve, and they serve well with PTSD. They go on to lead great lives and they get promoted. They do wonderful things,” Dr. Anthony Hassan, the president and CEO of Cohen Veterans Network, a mental health non-profit focusing on post-9/11 veterans, said last year. “So, it’s just a myth that keeps on going despite all of the efforts. There is still a lot more work to be done.” 

And PTSD doesn’t just come from combat. For example, a 2019 Defense Department Inspector General report found that service members who experience military sexual trauma are more likely to develop PTSD than service members who see combat. PTSD is also not specific to veterans — civilians experience traumatic events in their lives, too. 

The bottom line is that PTSD has always been a possible side effect of war, and experiencing it doesn’t make someone any less capable or worthy than someone without it. 

There’s no one reason why people join the military

Though there has long been a stereotype that those who join the military do so because they have no other option, that’s far from the truth. The reasons that service members join run the gamut from simply wanting a career — or even just a few years — in uniform, to wanting to take on a new challenge, or maybe because they saw a kick-ass movie that motivated them to head to the nearest recruiting office. 

2018 study of enlisted troops found that many joined because they wanted to travel, the benefits that came with military service, or they just wanted job stability.

Similar misconceptions also exist when it comes to Americans who believe service members signed up because of a burning need to sacrifice and serve their country. A study published in 2020 found that “many Americans continue to subscribe to an idealized image of service members as moved by self-sacrificing patriotism,” and that there are even different beliefs over why people join between troops and their families.

“This belief is most heavily concentrated among conservative Americans. Liberal Americans are more likely to believe that service members join primarily for economic reasons,” the study said. “Those furthest to the left are more inclined to aver that service members join chiefly to escape desperate circumstances. Perhaps most surprising, we discover a disconnect between respondents with military experience and their families: The former are more likely to acknowledge that pay and benefits are a primary motivation for service, whereas their families are more likely to embrace a patriotic service narrative.”

Like any other job, people may have joined the military because they wanted to, or felt passionate about it. Maybe they wanted health care benefits for their family, or they had a friend who told them how fun shooting stuff during training was. Maybe their grandparents served and they wanted to carry on their family legacy, or they didn’t know what the hell else to do with their life and needed to buy time to figure out a long-term plan." 

 

U.S Army World War II Veteran Andre Chappaz, who served from 1943-1946, salutes the flag during the national anthem in Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Georgia, Nov. 3, 2022. (Cpl. Yvonna Guyette/U.S. Marine Corps)

 Task And Purpose - What Americans Are Getting Wrong About Veterans

 Haley Britzky

 Haley Britzky joined Task & Purpose as the Army reporter in January 2019. She previously worked at Axios covering breaking news. She reports on important developments within the service, from new uniforms to new policies; the realities of military life facing soldiers and their families; and broader cultural issues that expand outside of the Army, touching each of the military services. Contact the author here.

 

Sunday, April 19, 2026

What It Means To Kill in Combat

 


"DEFENSE ONE"By Phil Zabriskie

"The killing a country does through its soldiers is part of its fabric and identity. The less it is examined, the less a country will know about itself, its impulses, and the impact of what it has trained and dispatched its sons and daughters to do."

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"If a war fails to achieve its stated objectives—as Vietnam did—it can make the reasons for killing even harder to accept. Some recent vets of Iraq and Afghanistan, said the psychiatrist, are already asking, “What was it all for?”

This is not to cast troops who kill in combat as victims. They should carry the weight of what they did. But they should not be forced to carry it alone. Their leadership, from the company level all the way to the Chief of Staff, is part of every killing that’s carried out. So too are the civilian architects of these wars. And the rest of us bear some responsibility as well.

The killing a country does through its soldiers is part of its fabric and identity. The less it is examined, the less a country will know about itself, its impulses, and the impact of what it has trained and dispatched its sons and daughters to do.

A more honest conversation about what war is and what war does is a good place to start. Those who [called] for boots on the ground in Iraq, Syria, or anywhere else, should be first to have it. They should understand and explain exactly what it [means] if troops are deployed, and they should press the military to give its charges tools that not only help them kill when they should, but also how to live with the killing they’ve done later in life.

More counseling must be made available as well, as part of the broader overhaul of the VA, and steps taken to remove the stigma that still exists around seeking help for the psychological wounds of war. And no one should ask a veteran if he or she has killed anybody unless they really want to hear the answer—and are prepared to listen."

What It Means To Kill In Combat

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Phil Zabriskie, a writer living in New York, is the author of The Kill Switch. Previously, he lived and worked throughout Asia and the Middle East, including in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

Friday, April 17, 2026

After Three-Year Hiatus, VA To Resume Rollout Of Electronic Medical Records System

 

 "MILITARY TIMES" By Patricia Kime

 "Four Veterans Affairs health systems in Michigan will activate the department’s new electronic health records system on Saturday, ending a three-year pause to a program that has been plagued by delays and cost overruns."

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"The VA Detroit Healthcare System, VA Saginaw Healthcare System, VA Ann Arbor and Battle Creek Healthcare Systems will flip the switch from the VA’s legacy digital medical record to the new Federal Electronic Health Record, currently used by six sites across the VA.

The department’s adoption of the Oracle Health’s FEHR was halted in 2023 following a year-long pause over safety and functionality concerns. The program, which was introduced to medical centers in Washington, Oregon and Ohio between 2020 and 2022, experienced numerous setbacks, including incidences of harm to at least 149 patients, according to the VA inspector general.

The safety problems were tied to a system feature that caused some specialty-care referrals, follow-on appointments and lab orders to disappear from view.

VA officials announced in late 2024 that they planned to restart the project in Michigan in 2026, and in March 2025, announced they would accelerate adoption by adding nine more sites this year.

Deputy Secretary Paul Lawrence said during an event Friday at the John D. Dingell VA Medical Center in Detroit that the VA expects to roll out the system to 26 additional sites next year.

“But already, folks in the VA system are knowing how well this is going to go. They’re asking to be moved up,” Lawrence said, according to the Detroit News.

Joining Lawrence at the Detroit event marking the “go-live,” VA Secretary Doug Collins said the department’s inspector general would monitor the system to ensure it was functioning.

“Our IG office is a wonderful group that helps us do better in what we do,” Collins said, according to the Detroit News.

The VA selected the system, made by Cerner, in 2017 after it was chosen by the Department of Defense for the military health system patients. The VA system originally was expected to take 10 years to adopt and cost $10 billion. That estimate was soon revised to $16 billion and now stands at $37.2 billion across the program’s lifecycle, according to Lawrence.

During the pause, the VA and Defense Department worked jointly to adopt the system at the James Lovell Federal Health Care Center in North Chicago. Between the lessons learned during that rollout and revisions, VA officials have seen vast improvements in performance where it is used, according to Lawrence.

The deputy secretary wrote in a blog post in March that Oracle Health had “improved system performance, reliability and usability,” running it without any outages 87% of the time between June 2023 and December 2025. The system also attained “incident free time” for nearly two years from March 2024 to December 2025, Lawrence wrote.

“The Federal EHR is now reliably available to end users without system-wide outages. We have reduced disruptions, prevented lost productivity and ensured critical workflows continue without delay,” Lawrence said.

Over the last several weeks, the Michigan facilities told patients to expect fewer available appointments and anticipate pharmacy delays in the ramp-up to the switchover.

In a message posted on the VA Detroit Medical Center X social media page, officials told veterans they also may see different prescription numbers on medications until they refill their prescriptions in the new system and could expect to see trainers helping staff learn the system.

“What is not changing is the same high-quality health care you have come to expect at Detroit VA Healthcare System,” they wrote on X.

Republicans and Democrats in Congress have told VA officials they are watching the restart closely and still have concerns about the system’s potential impact on veterans’ medical care and employee burnout.

Rep. Tom Barrett, R-Mich, chairman of the House Veterans’ Affairs Technology Modernization Subcommittee, said in a hearing in December, that VA physicians and pharmacists continue to have concerns over reliability and safety backstops.

“The only acceptable result is a flawless go live because our veterans cannot accept failure,” Barrett said.

Rep. Nikki Budzinski, D-Ill., said she was concerned that the VA had not completed all recommendations from the Government Accountability Office. The GAO had made several recommendations on improving and implementing the system and the VA had not fulfilled them.

“We need to have the difficult conversations to make sure that both Oracle and VA are accountable to Congress, to VA employees, and most importantly to veterans,” Budzinski said.

Dr. Neil Evans, acting program executive director, said the VA is “ready to roll.”

“VA remains committed to successfully implementing a modern, interoperable Electronic Health Record system, which we refer to as the federal EHR, and we intend to implement that across the entire VA enterprise. As was mentioned, since our last hearing in February, VA has made significant progress towards meeting that goal,” Evans said the hearing."

After three-year hiatus, VA to resume rollout of new electronic medical records system

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Patricia Kime is a senior writer covering military and veterans health care, medicine and personnel issues."

Sunday, April 12, 2026

This Is What We Do in America. We Pause. We Forget. Then We Begin The Next War

 

"THE WARHORSE" By M. Tabar

"My stepfather, brother, and I served in Afghanistan and Iraq. We are still there, frozen in the suck—a boomer, a Gen Xer, and a millennial—ducking mortars, mourning dead colleagues, and waiting for care packages curated by Mom.

For seven years, I was an aid worker outside the wire and embedded with the U.S. military inside the wire. In the mid-2000s, I overlapped with one or both of my family members in each war zone. We rarely speak of it."

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"In my multigenerational, vast military family, the suckstrained the bonds of love and commitment. Our individual experiences, worldview, and the impact of the wars upon us differed such that only silence maintains family cohesion. In sleep, we cry out what we cannot express in daylight, fighting our way out of the same village, the same valley, the same unarmored aid project pickup truck, again and again.

In the summer of 2021, bearded Taliban fighters swaggered from the shadows where they’d been governing secretly for decades and into the presidential palace to make their takeover official. Commentators in America lamented, “How did we come to this?” I didn’t ask that question. I sat alone in the dark sipping bourbon, staring out the window of my house in the African country where I now work. No one I served with asked that question as we texted our heartbreak. How else could the suck have possibly concluded? Yet still, the callouses of our collective cynicism didn’t buffer the gut punch of watching it unfold in real-time.

The two halves of the war blur together in a sandy haze of beige frustration. Iraq was bonkers, but Afghanistan was a special kind of hell. Iraq wore me down with unceasing explosions so regular the coffee tasted like plastic explosives by the time I departed. Afghanistan made me rethink my own nationalism and question the cognitive abilities of our elected officials. I arrived there in 2010 hoping that rural provinces were somewhat permissive, hoping that aid projects could have more success than in Iraq.

USAID-funded project needed an aid worker to assist military personnel on a joint U.S.-Afghan army outpost in Nangarhar province, on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. I had completed an 18-month tour on an embedded provincial reconstruction team in Iraq, so they selected me for the job in Afghanistan. My task at the Nangarhar outpost was to cover for a colleague who departed on an extended absence. I didn’t ask why, but I suspected the kidnapping of aid worker Linda Norgrove pushed my colleague’s mental resilience to the limit, necessitating a break.

My helicopter transport to the outpost included a U.S. Army personnel recovery team on a search mission for Norgrove, who’d been employed on another American USAID-funded project when she was taken. Fresh from Iraq, I wasn’t surprised. Aid workers are easy to kidnap. I hoped Linda would be found alive, and I wondered if this helo ride would finally be the one that killed me. Too many deployments made a person paranoid—each helo or convoy could be the last. But in my military family, I couldn’t show my face at Thanksgiving or survive my own mirror test if fear prevented me from completing an assignment.

The voyage began at Bagram Airfield and progressed to the outpost in Nangarhar. As we lifted off, soldiers barked instructions familiar to me from many years in Iraq—do not move, talk, complain, make noise, pass out, get in the way, demonstrate a need for any bodily function, or act like a fragile civilian female snowflake. I acknowledged with a smile. “Roger that.”

As we flew toward Nangarhar province, we dropped in on mountain villages. The soldiers searched for Norgrove and distributed pamphlets. Rooted in my designated seat, each time the unit leaped from the open doors and sprinted off, I counted minutes. I scanned mountainsides and brush for hairy, bearded mujahideen with Kalashnikovs or rocket-propelled grenade launchers. When the unit jumped back into the Black Hawks, I counted soldiers. After six nerve-bending hours of mountaintop sorties without locating Norgrove, the Black Hawks touched down for half a minute on an empty gravel landing zone at a Nangarhar combat outpost. A soldier kicked my pack out behind me and shouted, “Thanks for not being a shitty civilian. Don’t get kidnapped,” then lifted off.

Within days I discovered the aid project that brought me to this remote outpost couldn’t move the needle forward in rural Afghanistan any more than we could move needles forward in Iraq. I reread 30 pages of handover notes. Our aid projects couldn’t brand materials or equipment as American taxpayer-funded. There could be no sticker with the handshake and quote “from the American people.” Association with America meant a swift, guaranteed death of project grantees and beneficiaries.

When I inquired about local municipal approval and improving community participation in projects, my Afghan counterparts said—in a tone indicating How many times do I have to explain this to ignorant Americans venturing outside of Kabul—that the municipal government had no real control over the area. The “shadow government,” the Taliban’s parallel governance structure, needed to “allow” any project to take place in any area, or they’d attack the project site, the grantee, and the community beneficiaries. I put my head down on the plywood desk, defeated. Shadow government? Awesome. Same shit, different war zone.

When soldiers and I ventured out of the rural Nangarhar outpost on foot to meet with Afghan officials, they received us with polite rudeness, commanding painted tea boys to serve chai as they scowled at us across a low table. As in Iraq, visits from Americans marked Afghan counterparts for reprisal. We talked in circles through an interpreter whom they refused to look in the eye.

While we were hiking to a nearby town with soldiers to discuss the rehabilitation of local government buildings, kids threw rocks at us until I let down a waist-long braid from under my Kevlar helmet, my femaleness providing cover for the soldiers closest to me. Those in the rear took rocks in the face until we exited the town. At another meeting, the “shadow government” stepped into the day shift when the mayor looked at the Army captain to my right and asked why he brought a woman and a piece of shit (our Afghan interpreter’s eyes were slanted, his accent wasn’t local).

Two thoughts occurred to me in that moment. Go fuck yourself, Mr. Taliban—and, If a soldier and an aid worker meet Taliban shadow government officials like it’s cool, we’ve lost the whole damn war.

The Taliban shadow government, like the militias in Iraq, circled our aid projects and military outposts like sharks, sinking in their teeth on occasion, reminding us of their presence. Every project and village we assessed and placed on our stability continuum charts fell back into the red one after the other. In Nangarhar, the Taliban collected a protection tax from the population, surveilled aid projects, and took control of, or ruined, most of what any project managed to accomplish. The Taliban, like militias in Iraq, happily claimed new wells, rehabilitated clinics, and better roads, and blew up girls’ schools and women’s nursing colleges. Back in Iraq, soon, the black flags of ISIS would fly over many other USAID project locations.

In Nangarhar, locals unleashed their fury on the first American they could. For every Afghan grateful for the assistance provided, others spat at us because a drone strike or military operation killed their family members at a wedding, in their fields, at a funeral, or while they were driving down the road. Afghan kids had a name for our drones—buzzbuzzak. If children heard that unmistakable buzzing sound, they became inconsolable. Walking back to the outpost from one meeting, while kids shouted “buzzbuzzak” at us and chucked rocks, I asked the soldier ahead of me, “Captain. What the actual fuck are we doing here?”

Never taking his eye off the path ahead, he said, “Ma’am, I was gonna ask you the same thing.”

At the outpost in Nangarhar, we received incoming rockets or mortars every other night, with no sign of the glossy Kabul-like progress, no women graduating from colleges on the nearby Afghanistan-Pakistan border, no cappuccinos in cafes. One night, I bear-crawled from the female shower latrine to a bunker during a rocket attack, soaking wet and fully clothed because I always washed myself and my clothing in the shower. Covered in soap, I clutched a switchblade given to me by my Marine stepfather under my jacket sleeve, blade against my soapy wrist. Next to me, a shaking Army boot lieutenant, smooth-cheeked and barely out of college, held his weapon at low ready. A senior enlisted soldier, older and insubordinate under fire, commanded the young lieutenant to stay put and guard me, the only female civilian in the outpost, while all remaining soldiers manned the outpost perimeter. I contemplated suicide instead of captivity. I sure as hell wasn’t going to accept an extended slumber party with the Haqqani All-Stars.

Linda Norgrove didn’t survive. Aid workers died when captured in the suck, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and later, Syria. I’d given Iraq seven years of my youth. I decided not to waste what remained in Afghanistan. I completed my duties and refused follow-on assignments to Kandahar. I supported the program from Washington, D.C., and conducted the project close-out after-action review years later. I didn’t return to Afghanistan. But our military counterparts, like my stepfather and brother, cousins, uncles, and family friends, didn’t get to choose to go home. For our men and women in uniform, refusing a bullshit assignment or asking our leaders to take responsibility led to losing rank, clearances, jobs, and benefits.

I know the havoc endless war with no outcome wreaks on a military family. Born the year after the Vietnam War ended, I suffered its aftermath in fists across my four- and five-year-old face. My mother, a veteran herself, cried many nights, broken on the floor, both of us at the mercy of an enraged two-tour Vietnam veteran. A few years later, I watched a stepfather, a towering hulk of a Marine, crying in front of the television as his fellow Marines pulled body parts from rubble in Beirut less than a day after he left that same barracks to catch a flight home. During the Gulf War and Somalia, I watched my mother anguish, my brothers act out, while yet another stepfather packed his gear in the garage. The divorces, wars, and military bases blurred together as they do in military families. In Afghanistan and Iraq, I wasn’t surprised to see the familiar suicide watch posters plastered everywhere. I’ve known since childhood that when people return from a deployment, military or civilian, they’re different. Some don’t make it.

As I continue to process the heinous conclusion of the forever wars, rage and nightmares haunt me, as distracting and painful as the weeks and months after my deployments ended. I’ve lost hours and days in emotional emails with colleagues and family members or overthinking our American anomalies. I’ve woken up yelling and thrashing as I held my infant daughter. I struggle with our American habit of turning victory upside down and the decades spent squandering our legacy and mind-fucking the men and women who fought for it. Now that it is over, and America has gained nothing for the effort, I check military suicide rates. There are no statistics for the aid workers and other civilians who deployed. I hear by word of mouth that they are dying, too.

Like my family and me, many of those who served bounced between forever war zones. We lost spouses, legs, custody of children, memories, and bits of skull. We returned to find we had less freedom than when we deployed. While we wasted our youth in the suck, the Supreme Court and certain state governments showed their appreciation with an epic Thanks for your service, but fuck you by gutting the Civil Rights Actreducing rights and access to voting, and eliminating reproductive independence. Those of us who served represented America in the best way we could. We returned to a budding authoritarian state at war with itself, upending a lifetime of American ideals and freedoms that we carried with us into war because we believed them to be everlasting. When we returned, we didn’t recognize our own country.

The anger this generates is such that when anyone says “Thank you for your service” to anyone who served in the suck, resisting the urge to throat punch them is difficult. At best, it sounds like they are saying, “Thank you for a bit of lucky success, thank you for volunteering to be trapped in a nasty ideological-political experiment.” Thank you for surviving a 20-year bipartisan shitshow so they could stay home and train with a government-hating militia or play with the newest smartphone and eat avocado toast. The worst is a “thank you” with indifference from the politicians we voted for, who can’t bear to face mangled bodies, the twitch of trauma, or the poverty of a veteran.

Civilians like me—the aid workers, diplomats, intelligence officers, and defense contractors—we box up our traumas, hide them behind a game face like military kids. We aren’t veterans; therefore, we aren’t permitted a sloppy PTSD breakdown or suicide. But we didn’t evade despair. We know the sum of loss from the 20-year forever wars is immeasurable, and contemplating it bends the brain into psychosis. All the years sacrificed, dead and disappeared Afghan and Iraqi colleagues, battle buddies and youth lost, wasted money, and squandered American reputation and global leverage.

It’s been 21 years since the invasion of Afghanistan, 20 years since the invasion of Iraq. I am not over it. My family is not over it. The United States is not over it. America’s been fighting the same war in different iterations since Vietnam, wrecking military personnel and federal employees along the way like we’re all expendable deep-state trash. Because this is what we do in America. We pause. We forget. Then we begin the next war."

This Is What We Do in America. We Pause. We Forget. Then We Begin The Next War










M. Tabar
worked as a Peace Corps volunteer in Gabon and then on USAID and State Department-funded assistance projects in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Jordan, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Cameroon, Sri Lanka, Togo, and Haiti. She is an alumnus of the Universities of Oregon and Georgetown, where she studied anthropology, communications, and foreign languages, with a focus on the Middle East and Francophone Africa. She lives in West Africa with her family, where she is working on an aid program and revising a memoir on the forever wars.

Friday, April 10, 2026

What Happens To Our U.S. Political Leaders?


Left to right and top to bottom above: Elon Musk and Donald Trump, Colin Powell , Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Truman, Jimmy Carter and General Norman Schwarzkopf

"Rose Covered Glasses" By Ken Larson

"The world is crying for great leaders. They are out there, but I believe they are hesitant to step forward. It is worth examining why and what has happened to some recent United States great leaders."

______________________________________________________________________________

"This author watched for over 40 years in aerospace and defense as the massive machine of government ground up men of integrity who had a true sense of leadership, purpose and service.

Unknown to the average American is the swinging door of military personnel who enter the defense industrial complex and then move on into government civil positions, lobbying activities or enterprises tapping their former service background for gain and greed.  Statesmanship and integrity have a difficult time surviving in that environment. The potential for waste, fraud and abuse is tremendous: Star Creep and the Revolving Door


Colin Powell had difficulties in a government role because real integrity fares poorly in the big machine and he made the mistake of trusting the NSA and the CIA, as well as Lockheed Martin, SAIC and CSC on Iraq war policy

Dwight David Eisenhower was one of the last, great, ex-military presidents who led well in government. He warned us at the ink below about the big machine gathering power as he left office: Eisenhower Farewell Address


Harry Truman could not have made the type of hard decisions and "Buck Stops Here" operations in this day in age. The machine would have crippled him.

Jimmy Carter had integrity but did not fare well because the huge gears of government were grinding away by then.

General Schwarzkopf demonstrated true leadership potential in the first Gulf War but very prudently moved away from the government he served as a military officer when he retired. He was a Vietnam vet who knew the machine too well..

I worked in Aerospace through 7 Administrations and all I saw was the machine getting bigger, grinding up leadership principles, young soldiers, creating new enemies and spewing foreign interventions and profits for large corporations.

Our hope for the future is that the massive machine of government will be re-sized small enough so a true leader with statesman qualities will be inclined to take the helm and steer it in a direction away from political stagnation while fostering a resumption of the premiere place the US has had in history. 


We found the STRATFOR Article by George Friedman exceptional in its analysis of the limited power of the President and the absolute necessity of anyone holding office to be capable of evolving coalitions effectively in governing domestically and on the world stage:  U.S. Presidency Designed to Disappoint

Here are some select extracts: 

*** "Congress, the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve Board all circumscribe the president's power over domestic life. This and the authority of the states greatly limit the president's power, just as the country's founders intended. To achieve anything substantial, the president must create a coalition of political interests to shape decision-making in other branches of the government. Yet at the same time — and this is the main paradox of American political culture — the presidency is seen as a decisive institution and the person holding that office is seen as being of overriding importance."


*** "The American presidency is designed to disappoint. Each candidate must promise things that are beyond his power to deliver. No candidate could expect to be elected by emphasizing how little power the office actually has and how voters should therefore expect little from him. So candidates promise great, transformative programs. What the winner actually can deliver depends upon what other institutions, nations and reality will allow him." 

*** " The power often ascribed to the U.S. presidency is overblown. But even so, people -- including leaders -- all over the world still take that power very seriously. They want to believe that someone is in control of what is happening. The thought that no one can control something as vast and complex as a country or the world is a frightening thought. Conspiracy theories offer this comfort, too, since they assume that while evil may govern the world, at least the world is governed."

At the bottom line the only true measure of a leader is his or her character. We must decide that factor for ourselves as we enter the voting booth. It is the most independent action as a citizen that we take."



                                            Are Americans Truly Independent?

Saturday, April 04, 2026

Veterans Are Protected From Retaliation For Employment Discrimination Claims At Government Agencies

 


"FEDERAL TIMES" By Molly Weisner

"The quasi-judicial agency that protects federal employment rights that affirms veterans who work in the government are protected from retaliation for speaking out against discrimination.

The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed that federal employees who are veterans are protected from workplace harassment specifically under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Acts anti-retaliation provision. This landmark law has protected veterans from employment discrimination based on their military service since 1994."

________________________________________________________________________________

"Over the years, it been debated whether USERRA in itself protected veterans against “a hostile work environment” in the federal government. Refined standards make it clear that it does.

“USERRA was amended with explicit language to open the door for these kinds of [workplace harassment] claims to go forward,” said Ryan Gallucci, director of the Veterans of Foreign War’s Washington office, in a phone interview. “This is a positive development for veterans, and one that has been in the works for more than a decade.”

Several administrative bodies deal with USERRA cases, and MSPB’s focus is on appeals at the federal level. In a case last month, it clarified its standards, acknowledging that persistent harassment in a federal agency can rise to the level of severity such that it alters the conditions of a veteran’s employment, and therefore can trigger a freestanding retaliation complaint under the law if the protected activity was a motivating factor. Veterans make up about a third of the federal workforce, with 14% of all employed Gulf War-era veterans working for the government.

“The question of hostile work environments via USERRA asks the question of whether there’s a culture in a certain agency that is hostile to vets,” VFW’s Gallucci said. “And now veterans have peace of mind that workplace harassment will be taken seriously.”

The federal government has a host of laws and statutes that prevent discrimination of and retaliation against its employees. These can be confusing, especially if a veteran is new to government or is used to a different set of rules and reporting chains that applied to them as service members, said Siri Nelson, executive director of the National Whistleblower Center.

The MSPB case appears to harmonize those rules, she explained.

“The hostile work environment concept can be very confusing because it’s a term of art, which means that it’s something that the average person might interpret very differently than how it is [interpreted] under the law,” she said in an interview.

Better data still needed

The MSPB precedent is much needed, sources told Federal Times, but if the federal government is going to be a model employer as it has so often claimed, then that means not just adhering to the letter of the law, but also making sure federal agencies are self-reporting their success in doing so.

“Veterans have been an unappreciated minority since the 1970s, even as the country increasingly benefits from their service,” said Dan Meyer, a national security lawyer at Tully Rinckey, in a statement. He added that the next step should come from Congress to require more detailed reports of the MSPB and other enforcement agencies on what they are doing to protect veteran whistleblowers.

“The stats just are not being produced, and there is something odd in that silence,” he said in a statement.

Meyer said an example of the “gold standard” for reporting is the Department of Defense’s inspector general audit summary that goes to Congress every six months.

“Until you get to their level of granularity with respect to USERRA case handling, veterans’ discrimination reporting is just fluffing,” he said.

William Spencer, executive director of MSPB, told Federal Times that there’s no specific requirement for the agency to report or keep data on USERRA cases, though it does report some information in its annual report.  USERRA - Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act Reports

Spencer said as of April 2, there were 41 USERRA appeals pending before the Board on petition for review, and 22 initial USERRA appeals pending in regional offices. The agency declined to comment on whether the existing reporting mechanisms were sufficient to capture the true effectiveness of USERRA protections in the federal government.

The Department of Labor sends an annual report to Congress on USERRA cases, which includes data from state and private employers. USERRA applies to both public and private employers.

Gallucci said he supported having more detailed reporting standards at MSPB and in the federal government in general in order to paint a better picture of whether a certain agency is more hostile to veteran employees or whether a department fails to provide USERRA protections in good faith.

It’s not that the federal government is the worst perpetrator of discrimination against veterans, he said, but rather that the MSPB precedent makes clear that a veteran’s claim of a hostile workplace will be taken seriously, and that agencies, like all employers, must commit the same resources to a veterans’ concerns.

“I think the most important part of this, is the decision shows the value of protecting veterans right to assert their rights,” said Nelson. “The law doesn’t work if it can’t be used.”

Veterans get protections from retaliation at government agencies

About Molly Weisner

Molly Weisner is a staff reporter for Federal Times where she covers labor, policy and contracting pertaining to the government workforce. She made previous stops at USA Today and McClatchy as a digital producer, and worked at The New York Times as a copy editor. Molly majored in journalism at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.