Time To Retire The Phrase ‘Military Industrial Complex’

 

“RESPONSIBLE STATECRAFT” By Dan Grazier

“President Dwight Eisenhower coined this immortal phrase during his January 17, 1961 farewell address to warn Americans. “Sorry Ike: it’s a bit too dated and no longer the right moniker to describe what we’re up against.

The Pentagon, Congress, the defense industry, think tanks, lobbyists, and industry-sponsored media outlets are all very real.  When combined, they make up what is better termed the “National Security Establishment,” which Americans see in action all the time.”

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“It is time to retire the phrase “military-industrial complex.”

President Dwight Eisenhower coined this immortal phrase during his January 17, 1961 farewell address to warn Americans against the “acquisition of unwarranted influence” by the conjunction of “an immense military establishment and a large arms industry.”

As a five-star general, Ike knew, perhaps better than anyone, the self-serving and mutually beneficial relationship between the defense industry and the military. But he neglected to mention Congress’s role in the arrangement, nor could he necessarily have foreseen the ways in which corporate interests would intertwine themselves with the various bureaucracies that keep the Pentagon’s coffers flowing.

While the phrase “military-industrial-congressional-information complex” would be more accurate, it doesn’t exactly roll off the tongue. And like Eisenhower’s snappier appellation, it still suggests an element of conspiracy. But, of course, none of this is theoretical.

The Pentagon, Congress, the defense industry, think tanks, lobbyists, and industry-sponsored media outlets are all very real. When combined, they make up what is better termed the “National Security Establishment,” which Americans see in action all the time.

We see it when a retired general goes on television to explain exactly how the Ukrainian army can defeat the Russians — but only if Congress passes the latest billion-dollar aid package. No mention is made of the rather relevant fact that the general’s think tank is funded by defense contractors who stand to benefit from the aid package he is calling for.

We see it when another general retires from his post as the head of his service branch and turns up six months later on the board of a major defense contractor. Coincidentally, it’s the same defense contractor that celebrated a year earlier when that general announced the company had won the $21.4 billion contract to build a fleet of bombers.

We see it when a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee proposes the U.S. spend 5% of the gross domestic product every year on the military — a $55 billion increase to the current Pentagon budget. Predictably, he fails to mention that the majority of this money would go to defense contracts awarded to the same organizations that have given him more than $530,000 in campaign money since 2019. He fails to acknowledge how flush Pentagon budgets over the past 25 years created the sorry state of the military today.

We even see it when we least expect to, as when the country’s largest defense contractor runs advertisements during the Oscars and posts an interactive map on the company’s website touting the economic benefits of a weapon program. The company wants everyone to know how many jobs could be lost if Congress votes to disrupt the program in any way.

The American people also see the impact of these actions by the National Security Establishment.

We see tens of billions spent on a fighter jet that can only be reliably ready for combat a third of the time. We also see more than $60 billion spent designing and building warships that were so flawed Navy officials apparently can’t get rid of them fast enough. The Navy decommissioned one of these ships less than 5 years after its commissioning ceremony, roughly two decades ahead of the ship’s planned lifespan.

Starting in 2003, the Army spent at least $8 billion, and some sources say the better part of $20 billion, developing the Future Combat System, a family of armored vehicles to replace Cold War-era tanks, personnel carriers, and artillery vehicles. The Pentagon then canceled the program in 2009 with little to show for the effort and expense.

There are plenty of other examples of failed acquisition efforts from the past 25 years which partially explain why annual defense spending is now a whopping 48% higher than it was in 2000. Compounding these efforts is the Pentagon’s reliance on contractors to perform many roles once performed by uniformed service members at a much lower financial rate. The Department of Defense itself analyzed one case where hiring a group of contractors cost 316% more than the government employees tasked with similar work.

In a city where partisanship and political rancor impacts nearly every debate, wasteful and ineffective defense policies are a conspicuous exception. That is because the National Security Establishment is party-agnostic. Military contractors donate money to candidates and lobbyists on both sides of the aisle, those candidates vote for Pentagon budget increases and fund weapons programs long after their failures are widely known, and lobbyists and corporate-sponsored media groups generate public support for those programs.

Without massive structural changes, this pattern is all but certain to continue into future generations. Today’s National Security Establishment has launched several major weapons programs in recent years that, if allowed to continue on their current trajectories, will drive the annual Pentagon budget to truly unprecedented levels.

As programs like the B-21, Constellation-class frigate, Next Generation Air Dominance fighter jet, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, several ground vehicle programs, the Sentinel nuclear missile, and myriad space and cyber systems mature and enter full-rate production in the coming decades, the Pentagon budget will expand to cover the costs.

But this doesn’t have to be the case, if Congress actually does its oversight job. Several of these programs are already behind schedule and over budget. Costs for the Sentinel missile program have increased 81% to $140.9 billion from the original $77.7 billion estimate and it will still be several years before the first missile is installed in its silo. Yet, given the massive financial influence, even these egregious failures are all but glossed over, a simple footnote for most, and then prepared for a rubber stamp.

The services and their bureaucracies, the defense industry, members of Congress, and the paid mouthpieces promoting their interests in the media and during lobbying visits all comprise the all-too-real National Security Establishment. Identifying this network is the first step to avoid saddling future generations with the crushing debt associated with unsustainable U.S. military policies today.

While it is long-past time to update the name, Eisenhower’s warning is still more real than ever. Americans must remain vigilant and guard against the self-serving nature of this apparatus that is more intent on lining its own pockets than it is actually keeping Americans and our allies safe.”

Time To Retire The Phrase ‘Military Industrial Complex’

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Dan Grazier is a senior fellow and program director at the Stimson Center. He is a former Marine Corps captain who served tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. His assignments in uniform included tours with 2nd Tank Battalion in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and 1st Tank Battalion in Twentynine Palms, California.

Military Veteran Satire Writers Once Again Propose "The Department of Warfare" As A Business

CLICK IMAGE TO ENLARGE  By Tony and Friends On Rose Colored Glasses

We recommend, due to the age of this 17 year old piece, that you click on the image to enlarge. Let Tony, a winner of the “Thinking Blogger Award”, know what you think about “How war can be made FINANCIALLY profitable for the taxpayer.

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There is a prevalence of warfare in the current era. The U.S. tax payer finances military equipment/technology for our country and many others. The tax payer also donates soldiers to go in harms-way.   

Tony and his friends revisited our archives from 2007 on this subject. 

Not much has changed, other than the national debt has grown several orders of magnitude and the faces and places are different. 

With the above in mind we hereby propose, for the second time in the last 17 years, a discussion with your congressional representative a proposal to make war financially profitable for the taxpayer.

The Vietnam War Echos In Warfare And Politics Today

 By Ken Larson

My comrades and I who served in the Vietnam War were reminded of that period when reading the words of our leaders in the Washington Post Freedom of Information Act victory in the courts.  Washington Post Afghanistan Investigative FOIA Government Disclosures

We remember clearly the friends, innocence, physical and mental health lost in battle. We see the continuing implications of similar conflicts in which our country has since been involved.

Our conclusion is that war has become a racket and the capitalistic gains motive within the massive Military Industrial Complex (MIC) that Eisenhower warned us about as he left office has materialized.  

As the STRAFOR article below conveys, similar geopolitical conditions to today existed 50 years ago. 

Yet we have continued to approve this catastrophic money burner and debt creator https://www.usdebtclock.org/ in the interest of National Security making defense companies rich. It cannot continue.

“STRATFOR WORLDVIEW – Weighing the Geopolitics of the Vietnam” War

SUMMARY

“South Vietnam’s capital city, Saigon, fell to invading North Vietnamese troops on April 30, 1975. The image of an overloaded Huey helicopter on top of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, frantically loading refugees, was forever seared into the American mind. It was the ignominious end of more than a decade of involvement by the United States in Vietnam.

Ultimately, Washington’s failure to win the war in Vietnam resulted from factors beyond the conflict zone. The United States was heavily constrained by its global commitments — principally its need to secure Western Europe against Warsaw Pact invasion. Washington could not align military capabilities with realistic political goals to justify bringing the full might of U.S. armed forces to bear to defend its peripheral interests in Vietnam. Unable to comprehend North Vietnamese resolve and incapable of bringing about a swift victory, the United States’ will to continue the war crumbled as the human cost mounted. Today, the dominant narrative among the American public is that Vietnam was a crushing American defeat. Forty years after the fall of Saigon, however, it is apparent that Vietnam had only a limited impact on the overall U.S. position within the broader context of the Cold War.

The United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War resulted from the evolution of U.S. grand strategy in the wake of World War II. As part of the overall containment structure that Washington hoped to set in place around the Soviet Union — and eventually China as well — a network of allied countries became necessary to block the spread of communism. Many allies found themselves in direct proximity to the communist states America wanted to contain. This meant that any future war between the West and the Soviet Bloc would not be fought in the NATO heartland, but on the far-flung fringes of the two camps’ spheres of influence.

At the root of Washington’s alliance structure was the promise of U.S. support, hardened by what was supposed to be seen as a clear guarantee of assistance should the worst happen. In a divided Europe, for example, an attack on West Germany would be treated as an attack on the United States. Washington had given its word to assist, but by doing so, it put its credibility on the line. Despite written obligations, it was a constant struggle to fully convince the NATO allies that the United States, an ocean away, would truly risk nuclear war to defend West German soil in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasio

A wave of helicopters from the 1st Air Cavalry Division fly over an isolated landing zone during Operation Pershing, in the region of the Bong Son Plain and An Lao Valley of South Vietnam, Jan. 3, 1967.

This ambiguity was not lost on Moscow, and Russia continued to probe and pick at the perceived fault-lines in the American grand plan. By manufacturing crises, the Soviets hoped to generate a crippling uncertainty in America’s allies while emboldening their own clients. The Soviet insinuation was that, at a critical moment, the United States would not make good on its promises. So, when the United States found itself more and more involved in Vietnam, Washington was less interested in what Saigon was thinking or doing, or its virtues as a government, and more concerned with how its other allies, especially those in Europe, perceived the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to check the spread of communism within an allied country. When it came due for the United States to live up to its word, it was the international community and not Saigon that Washington looked toward. 

A Small Part of a Big Standoff

Vietnam was one small piece of a much bigger security challenge for Washington, with little intrinsic geopolitical value of its own. The real battles of the period — political and otherwise — were in Central Europe. Europe had to be prioritized, for if its resources and industrial capacity fell to the Warsaw Pact, the United States and its remaining allies would be unable to compete on either an economic or a military basis. For North Vietnam, however, the commitment to national unification was absolute. It pursued its own fundamental geopolitical interests and would give everything to achieve a victory — a single-minded devotion reflected in the horrendous casualties it suffered and the decades of conflict it endured. In the spectrum of conflict, the North Vietnamese were willing to embrace totality. This resolve was backed up with the support of powerful benefactors, namely the Soviets and the Chinese. From the United States’ perspective, committing the resources of the entire country against the North Vietnamese flew in the face of rational wisdom. Washington just had too many other interests. The conflict was ultimately decided by this imbalance of resolve.

U.S. Air Force F-100 bombs a military target near Saigon on Feb. 8, 1965.

The argument remains that the United States could have beaten North Vietnam by committing more forces. While this may be accurate, the United States, burdened by its greater contest with the Soviet Union, could not afford to trade the security of its global commitments for a localized victory in Vietnam. The fact of the matter remains that the defense of Indochina was only worth a certain amount of blood and treasure. The U.S. military was saddled with self-imposed constraints and only allocated limited resources to the campaign that, ultimately, proved insufficient for an extended nation-building effort. The United States had to think about strategic balance elsewhere and was limited in what it could realistically commit. Securing the resources required to defeat a massive foreign-sponsored insurgency in the dense Vietnamese jungle had little chance of finding political backing. The fact that the American public deeply opposed the war — a direct result of Vietnam’s murky strategic significance — further eroded the tenuous support for U.S. operations in Vietnam.

Provisional Revolutionary Government fighters seize control of the presidential palace in Saigon after the fall of the city. May 3, 1975.

Once troops were committed, the rationale of Washington’s grand strategy maneuvered the United States into a damning position. U.S. leaders believed that by circumventing the conflict, and showing that the United States was willing to welch on its promises, irreparable fissures could have weakened the alliance structure Washington had fought so hard to construct. Conversely, being unable and unwilling to fully commit to a conflict over a peripheral interest, a clear victory could not be assured, especially against a dedicated and well-supported enemy. 

Limited Geopolitical Impact

The United States did not retreat from the world in the wake of Vietnam. Still determined to contest Soviet influence but eager to avoid overcommitting itself again in the developing world, Washington became more judicious in its use of military force. Instead of relying on direct interventions, Washington shifted the burden of fighting to its clients across the world, providing less direct assistance when necessary. These shadowy operations were well suited for areas of peripheral importance. When they failed, their costs were relatively small; when they succeeded, they often had an outsize impact. This was demonstrated during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when the Soviet Union found that it was not prepared to pay the costs of a long counterinsurgency against U.S.-backed mujahideen.

A line of captured South Vietnamese soldiers walk through the streets of Saigon on April 30, 1975, escorted by communist troops.

The Vietnam War is popularly remembered as a U.S. defeat at the hands of an enemy a fraction of its size but, from a broader geopolitical perspective, it is hard to say what the United States really lost. The human cost of the war was certainly tremendous. Some 58,000 U.S. soldiers gave their lives in the conflict, and the war exacerbated huge social rifts in American society. Millions of Vietnamese perished on both sides — along with hundreds of thousands of people in Laos and Cambodia. Both victor and vanquished inherited a country broken by decades of war.

For the United States, the war was over in 1975. For the people of former Indochina, war would continue until 1979, consuming untold millions of lives. Yet, Washington’s worst fears did not materialize with the fall of Saigon. The United States retained its overall combat power and U.S. allies did not break from NATO en masse. The Soviets did not cross the Fulda Gap into West Germany, emboldened by a supposedly conspicuous collapse of U.S. resolve. Perhaps the U.S. refusal to empty its garrisons in Western Europe was far more meaningful a sign for America’s allies and adversaries than an iron commitment to Vietnam. Ultimately, for the United States, the geopolitical cost of the war was greatly overestimated.”