"Rose Covered Glasses" is a serious essay, satire and photo-poetry commentary from a group of US Military Veterans in Minnesota.
See Right Margin for Table of Contents and Free Book Downloads via "Box"
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I have learned a great deal in two military combat tours, 36 years in the weapons systems business and 17 years as a national and international volunteer counselor to small business.
The most important lesson has been that someone different than I may not have the same value system I possess, but by learning about them I will be able to make distinctions between my values and theirs.
That learning process permits me to consider accepting the differences between us, communicate with them and move forward on constructive objectives.
When governments and weapons makers treasure the economic windfalls in collective military industrial technology while refusing to negotiate, then political and military values on both sides of a world conflict collide.
Soldiers and civilians then die and economies endure massive debt or risk collapse while other world powers are forced to take sides.
All wars eventually result in negotiated settlements. Avoiding them by learning and negotiation in the first place is the most effective war weapon and by far the least costly in materials, debt and lives.
A look over our shoulders at our recent warfare is useful when viewing our future while making prudent decisions regarding financial and defense security. Every citizen from the individual voter to the politician must consider the risks and the opportunities to avoid the risks of war.
Effective negotiation must involve learning the other party’s values, not simply the perceived threat they represent to us because we do not know them.
From the neighborhood to the boardroom, from the Statehouse to the Congress and the White House, we would do well to learn more about those different from us before we fight.
The way forward lies in developing a mutual understanding of our respective values and cultures in lieu of fighting wars by using diplomacy and negotiation to save lives and economies.
Nations are evolving technological tools for communication at a startling pace. Our diplomacy, and negotiation must keep pace by using those tools with communicative, knowledgeable leadership to keep the peace.
"The thanks comes across as shallow, disconnected, a reflexive offering from people who, while meaning well, have no clue what soldiers did over there or what motivated them to go, and who would never have gone themselves nor sent their own sons and daughters.
Something in the stomach tumbles from expressions of appreciation that are so disconnected from the “evil, nasty stuff you do in war; when your war turns out to have feet of clay — whether fighting peasants in Vietnam or in the name of eradicating weapons of mass destruction that never materialized."
"So what to say to a vet? Maybe promise to vote next time, Mr. Freedman said, or offer a scholarship or job (as, he said, some places have stepped up and done). Stand up for what’s right, suggested Mr. O’Brien.
The thanks Mr. Garth gets today remind him of both the bad times and the good, all of which carry more meaning than he has now in civilian life. Hardest is the gratitude from parents of fallen comrades. “That’s the most painful thank you,” he said. “It’s not for me, and I’m not your son.” He struggled to explain his irritation. “It’s not your fault,” he said of those thanking him. “But it’s not my fault either.”
Mr. Freedman, 33, feels like the thanks “alleviates some of the civilian guilt,” adding: “They have no skin in the game with these wars. There’s no draft.” No real opinions either, he said. “At least with Vietnam, people spit on you and you knew they had an opinion.” Thank you for your service,” he said, is almost the equivalent of “I haven’t thought about any of this.”
Tim O’Brien, a Vietnam vet and the author of the acclaimed book “The Things They Carried,” told me that his war’s vets who believed in the mission like to be thanked. Others, himself included, find that “something in the stomach tumbles” from expressions of appreciation that are so disconnected from the “evil, nasty stuff you do in war.”
The more so, he said, “when your war turns out to have feet of clay” — whether fighting peasants in Vietnam or in the name of eradicating weapons of mass destruction that never materialized.
Mr. Garth appreciates thanks from someone who makes an effort to invest in the relationship and experience."
"THE HILL" By Jim Jones - Vietnam Combat Veteran, Idaho Attorney General (1983-1991) and 12 Year Justice On The Idaho Supreme Court (2005-2017)
"Both the 2001 and 2002 congressional authorizations should be repealed because they are no longer needed and are ticking time bombs of potential abuse should future military action be necessitated,
The public should demand action, rather than once again handing a president carte blanche authority to conduct a limitless war."
"The nation recently observed the anniversary of the horrendous 9/11 attacks by Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network. Bin Laden died 12 years ago and, while there are still elements of his network in various locales around the world, al Qaeda no longer poses a direct threat to the American homeland.
After the 9/11 attacks, it made sense for Congress to authorize the president to respond — to seek out and neutralize the terrorists and their enablers. Congress has historically granted the executive branch the ability to conduct war through what is called authorization for use of military force (AUMF) in specified circumstances. They should obviously be narrowly targeted at the culprits and those in league with them, rather than granting virtually unlimited power to conduct warfare.
Unfortunately, the 2001 AUMF approved by Congress on Sept. 18, 2001, which initiated the country’s global war on terrorism, was not limited in time, geographic scope or circumstances. It is still very much alive today, even though the threat it was intended to address has largely dissipated.
There is good reason to believe that the carte blanche war-making power granted in the 2001 authorization was designed to include military action against Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq. Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were both part of an organization advocating the removal of Hussein well before George W. Bush was elected president.
Congress approved a 2002 authorization specifically directed against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, but there is strong evidence to suggest that the Bush administration had already decided in the fall of 2001 to invade Iraq. The 2002 war authorization was just handy window dressing. That no evidence turned up to justify the Iraq War was not the result of an intelligence failure. Rather, it likely resulted from a fabrication of intelligence.
Many American and Iraqi lives were lost because of the overly broad 2001 authorization and the totally unwarranted 2002 authorization. Nearly 4,600 U.S. service personnel and 3,650 American contractors died in the Iraq War and its aftermath. There have been between 280,771 and 315,190 Iraqi civilians killed by direct violence since the U.S. invasion. All of those deaths can be laid at the feet of Vice President Dick Cheney, Sec. of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the other opportunists who took advantage of the 9/11 tragedy, twisting the nation’s grief and anger to further their personal political agenda of conquering Iraq.
In addition to the cost in human lives, the AUMFs imposed crushing economic burdens on American taxpayers. The cost for just the Iraq War was about $2 trillion. The total cost, past and future, for the global war on terror, has been estimated at $8 trillion, including almost $6 trillion for war and war-related outlays through fiscal year 2022.
Added to the cost in blood and treasure is the loss of trust in America’s leaders, both by our own people and by our allies across the world, the extreme wear and tear on our military from having to conduct two bruising wars simultaneously and the fact that we handed a great victory to Iran by disposing of Saddam Hussein, its arch enemy. It is unfortunate that Rumsfeld, Cheney and their enablers were not called to account in the criminal justice system for their misuse of the congressional war authorizations.
There is no reason for the 2002 authorization to remain on the books. It should be outright repealed. The Senate voted overwhelmingly for repeal in March and the issue is supposed to come before the House of Representatives soon. Americans should weigh in to see that it gets done.
The 2001 AUMF may have provided some initial benefits to the United States in Afghanistan but, overall, it has done more harm than good to the country. Because of its virtually limitless wording, it poses a much greater threat of potential misuse in the future. Legislation is pending in the House that would repeal the 2001 AUMF and replace it with a measure narrowly targeting existing terrorist threats. House Joint Resolution 2 also contains a sunset clause, so it would not be on the books forever. The public should demand quick and favorable action on this legislation.
Both congressional authorizations should be repealed because they are no longer needed and are ticking time bombs of potential abuse. Should future military action be necessitated, Congress must do its job — demand adequate justification for an AUMF, tailor it to the exact needs and limit its duration — rather than once again handing a president carte blanche authority to conduct a limitless war.
I
am a Vietnam Veteran and former federal contracts manager, who has
been in the VA Health Care System for 19 years. History
and experience must be connected to yield some tough solutionstoa
project that has spanned decades without yielding results
The
expense and poor performance in the VA Healthcare records system
upgrade, recently highlighted in the Congress and the Press, reveal a
dire necessity for simplification, communication and efficiency
in processes and systems.
However,
the real root causes lie in the massive volume of war veterans
returning from our wars in the Middle East over the last two decades,
coupled with the historically poor process and systems work conducted
between the Department of Defense and the VA utilizing poorly managed
contractors taking home millions on systems specifications that
change like the wind blows.
The
news media, the auditors and the average American are pointing the
finger at the President and the Head of the VA. One cannot
ignore the accountability aspects of these individuals.
HISTORY:
After returning from two combat tours in Vietnam, I worked in the
government contracting environment for 36 years then went through the
VA system as a Veteran getting treatment at retirement in 2006. I am
in the system today.
In
2006 I found the VA had a magnificent system capable of handling
medical records and treatment anywhere in the world once a veteran
was in the system; a key point. Why have we had such
deterioration?
ANSWER: We
have not experienced deterioration in services within the VA itself,
except from pressures due to millions returning from war
coupled with COVID factors and human beings who look for excuses when
systems fail.
We
have had 2 decades of Middle East incursions, a sudden discharge of
veterans and poor management from the DOD to the VA, from the systems
contractors to the state veterans homes. Veterans fall
through the cracks as a result. We have a cost plus contracting
scenario in the form of veterans care systems mismanagement and it
will cost billions to fix.
THAT
IS THE COST OF WAR. We must have effective and timely veterans health
care or our volunteer army will disappear. Low
recruiting numbers in
the present day are demonstrating that fact.
THE
TOTAL SPECTRUM MUST BE VIEWED TO MANAGE THE ISSUES.
BACKGROUND
A
3 part special in Time Magazine in 2013 addressed the serious
gaps developing between treatment, benefits and services
processes and systems between the military services and the
Veterans Administration:
“While
awaiting processing, “the veteran’s claim sits stagnant for
up to 175 days as VA awaits transfer of complete (service
treatment records) from DoD,”:
After yearsof
work to move toward integrated electronic records that
would eliminate this sort of delay, Defense Secretary Chuck
Hagel conceded in that the Defense Department was not holding up
its end of the bargain to improve the disability process.
“I
didn’t think, we knew what the hell we were doing.”:
The
above scenario is not unlike the Walter Reed Army Hospital
care fiasco a few years ago, before the facility was shut down
and consolidated with the Bethesda Naval facility.
The
VA decided to have those who would actually use the system
(claims processors) work with software developers. This process
would take longer, they estimated, but would create a system more
likely to meet the needs of those who actually use it. VA also
worked closely with major Congressional-chartered veterans’
service organizations.
2013
was the year in which regional offices were to be transitioned to the
resulting electronic system. It obviously did not occur as
planned.
In
recent years a switch to the commercial software approach through a
single company contract award without competition by the VA has been
a $16 Billion debacle. The non-compete contract was justified because
the awarded contractor already had the in-process contract for DOD
records system modernization.
Both
DOD and the Veterans Administration use service contractors to
perform this type of systems development.Government
Computer News (GCN) carried a story on the difficulties
experienced with, “Performance-Based Contracting”, which
has been made part of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in an
attempt to pre-establish at contract award those discrete outcomes
that determine if and when a contractor will be paid.
Interestingly
enough, the article splits the blame for the difficulties right
down the middle, stating the government typically has problems
defining what it wants as an end product or outcome and looks to
contractors to define it for them. More than willing to do so,
the contractors detail specific end products or outcomes, set
schedule milestones and submit competitive proposals. The
winner is selected based on what the government thinks it needs at
the time to fulfill its requirement and a contract is negotiated.
Once underway, the government decides it wants something else
(usually a management-by-government committee phenomena with a
contractor growing his product or service by offering lots of
options).
The
resulting change of contract scope invalidates the original
price and schedule, so a whole new round of proposals and
negotiations must occur with the winner while the losers watch
something totally different evolve than that for which they
competed. The clock keeps ticking and the winner keeps getting
his monthly bill paid based on incurred cost or progress
payments.
CONCLUSION
The
present state of the economy and the needs of our servicemen
will not allow the aforementioned to continue. Government
agencies are now hard pressed to insure the most “Bang for
the Buck”. It is in the long term interests of the politician, the
DOD, the VA and astute contractors to assist in that endeavor.
(1)The
only way to achieve such an objective is through sound technical,
cost and schedule contract definition via an iterative process of
baseline management and control.
(2)
Government civil servants must be trained to report systemic poor
service up the line in lieu of hiding bad news from superiors or
developing workarounds. This must be an expectation built into
their job description and they must be rewarded and promoted for
meeting that requirement just as they are for the other requirements
of their jobs.
The
first whistle to be blown must be to the boss when the service issue
occurs, not to the press a year from the occurrence.
Government
service contracting improvement in DOD and the Veterans
Administration as well as better management of federal government
contractorsare
mandatory.There
are solutions, but they involve accountability, discipline and
change.
Our
returning soldiers and those who have served before deserve better.
"If history is any judge, the U.S. government will be paying for the
Iraq and Afghanistan wars for the next century as service members and
their families grapple with the sacrifices of combat.
An
Associated Press analysis of federal payment records found that the
government is still making monthly payments to relatives of Civil War
veterans — 148 years after the conflict ended.
At the 10-year
anniversary of the start of the Iraq War, more than $40 billion a
year is going to compensate veterans and survivors from the
Spanish-American War from 1898, World War I and II, the Korean War, the
Vietnam War, the two Iraq campaigns and the Afghanistan conflict. And
those costs are rising rapidly.
U.S. Sen. Patty Murray said such expenses should remind the nation about war's long-lasting financial toll.
"When
we decide to go to war, we have to consciously be also thinking about
the cost," said Murray, D-Wash., adding that her WWII veteran father's
disability benefits helped feed their family.
Alan Simpson, a
former Republican senator and veteran who co-chaired President Barack
Obama's deficit committee in 2010, said government leaders working to
limit the national debt should make sure that survivors of veterans need
the money they are receiving.
"Without question, I would affluence-test all of those people," Simpson said.
With greater numbers of troops surviving combat injuries because of
improvements in battlefield medicine and technology, the costs of
disability payments are set to rise much higher.
The AP identified
the disability and survivor benefits during an analysis of millions of
federal payment records obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.
To
gauge the postwar costs of each conflict, the AP looked at four
compensation programs that identify recipients by war: disabled
veterans; survivors of those who died on active duty or from a
service-related disability; low-income wartime vets over age 65 or
disabled; and low-income survivors of wartime veterans or their disabled
children.
THE IRAQ WARS AND AFGHANISTAN
So
far, the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and the first Persian Gulf conflict
in the early 1990s are costing about $12 billion a year to compensate
those who have left military service or family members of those who have
died.
Those post-service compensation costs have totaled more
than $50 billion since 2003, not including expenses of medical care and
other benefits provided to veterans, and are poised to grow for many
years to come.
The new veterans are filing for disabilities at
historic rates, with about 45 percent of those from Iraq and Afghanistan
seeking compensation for injuries. Many are seeking compensation for a
variety of ailments at once.
Experts see a variety of factors
driving that surge, including a bad economy that's led more jobless
veterans to seek the financial benefits they've earned, troops who
survive wounds of war, and more awareness about head trauma and mental
health.
VIETNAM WAR
It's been 40 years since the U.S. ended its involvement in the Vietnam War, and yet payments for the conflict are still rising.
Now
above $22 billion annually, Vietnam compensation costs are roughly
twice the size of the FBI's annual budget. And while many disabled
Vietnam vets have been compensated for post-traumatic stress disorder,
hearing loss or general wounds, other ailments are positioning the war
to have large costs even after veterans die.
Based on an uncertain
link to the defoliant Agent Orange that was used in Vietnam, federal
officials approved diabetes a decade ago as an ailment that qualifies
for cash compensation — and it is now the most compensated ailment for
Vietnam vets.
The VA also recently included heart disease among
the Vietnam medical problems that qualify, and the agency is seeing
thousands of new claims for that condition. Simpson said he has a lot of
concerns about the government agreeing to automatically compensate for
those diseases."
On August 1st, 2007, I was having dinner in a restaurant next to the Highway 61 Bridge in Hastings, Minnesota with a retired businessman, his girlfriend, and a local lawyer and his wife.Glancing up at the TV over the bar, we were witnesses to the news of the 35W Bridge collapse into the Mississippi River.
As we left the restaurant we looked up at the
underside of the Highway 61 Bridge since we had parked on the land side parking
lot beneath it.We noted the general
condition of the structure and wondered if it too was a risky passage, 26 miles
further downstream over the same body of water on which the 35W tragedy had
occurred.
Within months the Minnesota DOT had come to
the conclusion that the bridge was indeed risky. They began making
immediate temporary repairs while planning for a new span.The existing Hastings Bridge had been erected
in 1951. Its planned replacement, scheduled for 2019, was accelerated to commence
in 2010,based on the condition of the
structure and the fact it is one of the busiest bridges in the state,
handling enormous traffic as a major north/ south artery from the Twin Cities.
BRIDGE AT HASTINGS IN 2007
“BRIDGING” FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND CONTRACTING INTERESTS
Planners at the Minnesota DOT are to be
applauded for the manner in which this project has proceeded and the people of
the community, as well as their civic, government and industry leaders should
be congratulated for the businesslike, cooperative and efficient manner in
which this project has been conducted.
Local community meetings solicited input from
the citizens on the design. The options were carefully weighed in terms of
environmental and aesthetic impact.Hastings, Minnesota is an old river town with a preservationist ethic
that spans generations. That fact was not ignored.The Highway 61 corridor has remained open,
eliminating a major detour for commuters.
The state ran a competitive bidding
process.The winning contractor joint
venture was a team of reputable companies who planned to use state of the art
pre-stressed concrete as a design to construct the longest such span on the
North American Continent, costing millions below the state estimate for the
job.
Heavy girders have been manufactured locally
in Minnesota and transported from north of Minneapolis to the Hastings site
with computer steered special transports involving minimal disruption.The large, arch frame for the bridge was
recently floated downstream from a staging area near Lock and Dam 2 on the
Mississippi after having been assembled by skilled union iron workers.
It was lifted in place on 24 September by the
largest heavy lifting equipment company in the world, who traveled from Europe to support the project.
The Coast Guard, Corps of Engineers, State
DOT, Hastings Community and all related support organizations have worked in a
cooperative manner to achieve a demanding schedule.
OUR NEW HORIZON
POLITICIANS
I have yet to hear a politician or agency
official attempt to take credit for this project or pursue some form of
attention-seeking advantage as a result of it.In an election year, considering the nature of politics these days, that
is a highly unusual occurrence.
I am sure there will be events commemorating
the project success, as there should be; but it is my hope those events will
celebrate the true nature of the achievement.
SUMMARY
It was a pleasure observing the Highway
61 bridge replacement over the Mississippi at Hastings. Its planning, execution
and achievement have been exemplary to an old project manager who has witnessed
difficulties with entrenched bureaucracies in industry and government for years.
This has been a shared, community, cooperative
venture, worthy of note when considering models for the future of our country
and the path it must take to overcome many challenges – political, economic and
technological.
Certainly similar projects can be undertaken involving other infrastructure programs such as education using the same form of
cooperative, shared, professional action.
Let’s build bridges like this one in
many other fields of endeavor!
Left to right and top to bottom above: Elon Musk and Donald Trump, Colin Powell , Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Truman, Jimmy Carter and General Norman Schwarzkopf
"Rose Covered Glasses" By Ken Larson
"The world is crying for great leaders. They are out there, but I believe they are hesitant to step forward. It is worth examining why and what has happened to some recent United States great leaders."
"This author watched for over 40 years in aerospace and defense as the massive machine of government ground up men of integrity who had a true sense of leadership, purpose and service.
Unknown to the average American is the swinging door of military personnel who enter the defense industrial complex and then move on into government civil positions, lobbying activities or enterprises tapping their former service background for gain and greed. Statesmanship and integrity have a difficult time surviving in that environment. The potential for waste, fraud and abuse is tremendous: Star Creep and the Revolving Door
Colin Powell had difficulties in a government role because real integrity fares poorly in the big machine and he made the mistake of trusting the NSA and the CIA, as well as Lockheed Martin, SAIC and CSC on Iraq war policy
Dwight David Eisenhower was one of the last, great, ex-military presidents who led well in government. He warned us at the ink below about the big machine gathering power as he left office: Eisenhower Farewell Address
Harry Truman could not have made the type of hard decisions and "Buck Stops Here" operations in this day in age. The machine would have crippled him.
Jimmy Carter had integrity but did not fare well because the huge gears of government were grinding away by then.
General Schwarzkopf demonstrated true leadership potential in the first Gulf War but very prudently moved away from the government he served as a military officer when he retired. He was a Vietnam vet who knew the machine too well..
I worked in Aerospace through 7 Administrations and all I saw was the machine getting bigger, grinding up leadership principles, young soldiers, creating new enemies and spewing foreign interventions and profits for large corporations.
Our hope for the future is that the massive machine of government will be re-sized small enough so a true leader with statesman qualities will be inclined to take the helm and steer it in a direction away from political stagnation while fostering a resumption of the premiere place the US has had in history.
We found the STRATFOR Article by George Friedman exceptional in its analysis of the limited power of the President and the absolute necessity of anyone holding office to be capable of evolving coalitions effectively in governing domestically and on the world stage: U.S. Presidency Designed to Disappoint
Here are some select extracts:
*** "Congress, the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve Board all circumscribe the president's power over domestic life. This and the authority of the states greatly limit the president's power, just as the country's founders intended. To achieve anything substantial, the president must create a coalition of political interests to shape decision-making in other branches of the government. Yet at the same time — and this is the main paradox of American political culture — the presidency is seen as a decisive institution and the person holding that office is seen as being of overriding importance."
*** "The American presidency is designed to disappoint. Each candidate must promise things that are beyond his power to deliver. No candidate could expect to be elected by emphasizing how little power the office actually has and how voters should therefore expect little from him. So candidates promise great, transformative programs. What the winner actually can deliver depends upon what other institutions, nations and reality will allow him."
*** " The power often ascribed to the U.S. presidency is overblown. But even so, people -- including leaders -- all over the world still take that power very seriously. They want to believe that someone is in control of what is happening. The thought that no one can control something as vast and complex as a country or the world is a frightening thought. Conspiracy theories offer this comfort, too, since they assume that while evil may govern the world, at least the world is governed."
At the bottom line the only true measure of a leader is his or her character. We must decide that factor for ourselves as we enter the voting booth. It is the most independent action as a citizen that we take."
We
remember clearly the friends, innocence, physical and mental health
lost in battle. We see the continuing implications of similar
conflicts in which our country has since been involved.
Our
conclusion is that war has become a racket and the capitalistic gains
motive within the massive Military Industrial Complex (MIC) that
Eisenhower warned us about as he left office has materialized.
As
the STRAFOR article below conveys, similar geopolitical conditions to
today existed 50 years ago.
Yet
we have continued to approve this catastrophic money burner and debt
creator https://www.usdebtclock.org/in
the interest of National Security making defense companies rich. It
cannot continue.
“STRATFOR
WORLDVIEW – Weighing
the
Geopolitics of the Vietnam” War
SUMMARY
“South
Vietnam’s capital city, Saigon, fell to invading North Vietnamese
troops on April 30, 1975. The image of an overloaded Huey
helicopter on top of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, frantically loading
refugees, was forever seared into the American mind. It was the
ignominious end of more than a decade of involvement by the United
States in Vietnam.
Ultimately,
Washington’s failure to win the war in Vietnam resulted from
factors beyond the conflict zone. The United States was heavily
constrained by its global commitments — principally its need to
secure Western Europe against Warsaw Pact invasion. Washington could
not align military capabilities with realistic political goals
to justify bringing the full might of U.S. armed forces to bear
to defend its peripheral interests in Vietnam. Unable to comprehend
North Vietnamese resolve and incapable of bringing about a swift
victory, the United States’ will to continue the war crumbled
as the human cost mounted. Today, the dominant narrative among
the American public is that Vietnam was a crushing American defeat.
Forty years after the fall of Saigon, however, it is apparent that
Vietnam had only a limited impact on the overall U.S. position
within the broader context of the Cold War.
The
United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War resulted from the
evolution of U.S. grand strategy in the wake of World War II. As part
of the overall containment structure that Washington hoped to set in
place around the Soviet Union — and eventually China as well — a
network of allied countries became necessary to block the spread of
communism. Many allies found themselves in direct proximity to the
communist states America wanted to contain. This meant that any
future war between the West and the Soviet Bloc would not be fought
in the NATO heartland, but on the far-flung fringes of the two
camps’ spheres of influence.
At
the root of Washington’s alliance structure was the promise of
U.S. support, hardened by what was supposed to be seen as a clear
guarantee of assistance should the worst happen. In a divided Europe,
for example, an attack on West Germany would be treated as an attack
on the United States. Washington had given its word to assist, but by
doing so, it put its credibility on the line. Despite written
obligations, it was a constant struggle to fully convince the NATO
allies that the United States, an ocean away, would truly risk
nuclear war to defend West German soil in the event of a Warsaw Pact
invasio
Awave
of helicopters from the 1st Air Cavalry Division fly over an isolated
landing zone during Operation Pershing, in the region of the Bong Son
Plain and An Lao Valley of South Vietnam, Jan. 3, 1967.
This
ambiguity was not lost on Moscow, and Russia continued to probe and
pick at the perceived fault-lines in the American grand plan. By
manufacturing crises, the Soviets hoped to generate a crippling
uncertainty in America’s allies while emboldening their own
clients. The Soviet insinuation was that, at a critical moment, the
United States would not make good on its promises. So, when
the United States found itself more and more involved in
Vietnam, Washington was less interested in what Saigon was
thinking or doing, or its virtues as a government, and more concerned
with how its other allies, especially those in Europe, perceived the
seriousness of the U.S. commitment to check the spread of communism
within an allied country. When it came due for the United States to
live up to its word, it was the international community and not
Saigon that Washington looked toward.
A
Small Part of a Big Standoff
Vietnam
was one small piece of a much bigger security challenge for
Washington, with little intrinsic geopolitical value of its own. The
real battles of the period — political and otherwise — were in
Central Europe. Europe had to be prioritized, for if its resources
and industrial capacity fell to the Warsaw Pact, the United States
and its remaining allies would be unable to compete on either an
economic or a military basis. For North Vietnam, however, the
commitment to national unification was absolute. It pursued its
own fundamental geopolitical interests and would give everything to
achieve a victory — a single-minded devotion reflected in the
horrendous casualties it suffered and the decades of conflict it
endured. In the spectrum of conflict, the North Vietnamese were
willing to embrace totality. This resolve was backed up with the
support of powerful benefactors, namely the Soviets and the Chinese.
From the United States’ perspective, committing the resources of
the entire country against the North Vietnamese flew in the face
of rational wisdom. Washington just had too many other interests. The
conflict was ultimately decided by this imbalance of resolve.
U.S.
Air Force F-100 bombs a military target near Saigon on Feb. 8, 1965.
The
argument remains that the United States could have beaten North
Vietnam by committing more forces. While this may be accurate, the
United States, burdened by its greater contest with the Soviet Union,
could not afford to trade the security of its global commitments for
a localized victory in Vietnam. The fact of the matter remains that
the defense of Indochina was only worth a certain amount of blood and
treasure. The U.S. military was saddled with self-imposed constraints
and only allocated limited resources to the campaign that,
ultimately, proved insufficient for an extended nation-building
effort. The United States had to think about strategic balance
elsewhere and was limited in what it could realistically commit.
Securing the resources required to defeat a massive foreign-sponsored
insurgency in the dense Vietnamese jungle had little chance of
finding political backing. The fact that the American public deeply
opposed the war — a direct result of Vietnam’s murky strategic
significance — further eroded the tenuous support for U.S.
operations in Vietnam.
Provisional
Revolutionary Government fighters seize control of the presidential
palace in Saigon after the fall of the city. May 3, 1975.
Once troops were
committed, the rationale of Washington’s grand strategy maneuvered
the United States into a damning position. U.S. leaders believed that
by circumventing the conflict, and showing that the United States was
willing to welch on its promises, irreparable fissures could have
weakened the alliance structure Washington had fought so hard to
construct. Conversely, being unable and unwilling to fully commit to
a conflict over a peripheral interest, a clear victory could not
be assured, especially against a dedicated and well-supported enemy.
Limited Geopolitical Impact
The United States
did not retreat from the world in the wake of Vietnam. Still
determined to contest Soviet influence but eager to avoid
overcommitting itself again in the developing world, Washington
became more judicious in its use of military force. Instead of
relying on direct interventions, Washington shifted the burden of
fighting to its clients across the world, providing less direct
assistance when necessary. These shadowy operations were well suited
for areas of peripheral importance. When they failed, their costs
were relatively small; when they succeeded, they often had an outsize
impact. This was demonstrated during the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, when the Soviet Union found that it was not prepared to
pay the costs of a long counterinsurgency against U.S.-backed
mujahideen.
A
line of captured South Vietnamese soldiers walk through the streets
of Saigon on April 30, 1975, escorted by communist troops.
The
Vietnam War is popularly remembered as a U.S. defeat at the hands of
an enemy a fraction of its size but, from a broader geopolitical
perspective, it is hard to say what the United States really lost.
The human cost of the war was certainly tremendous. Some 58,000 U.S.
soldiers gave their lives in the conflict, and the war exacerbated
huge social rifts in American society. Millions of Vietnamese
perished on both sides — along with hundreds of thousands of
people in Laos and Cambodia. Both victor and vanquished inherited a
country broken by decades of war.
For
the United States, the war was over in 1975. For the people of former
Indochina, war would continue until 1979, consuming untold millions
of lives. Yet, Washington’s worst fears did not
materialize with the fall of Saigon. The United States retained its
overall combat power and U.S. allies did not break from
NATO en masse. The Soviets did not cross the Fulda Gap into West
Germany, emboldened by a supposedly conspicuous collapse of U.S.
resolve. Perhaps the U.S. refusal to empty its garrisons in
Western Europe was far more meaningful a sign for America’s allies
and adversaries than an iron commitment to Vietnam. Ultimately, for
the United States, the geopolitical cost of the war was greatly
overestimated.”
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